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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the asserted goals of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is to promote peace in the region and reconciliation within the countries torn apart by the violence and
bloodshed.' International criminal trials-trials conducted by a tribunal
established through the exercise of UN authority and applying international standards of justice-inaugurate a process of acknowledgment and
confrontation of mass violence.2 The Security Council's vote in 1993 to
1.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. Punishment of offenders, deterrence of violations, and promotion of
peace are the goals enshrined in the preamble to the Statute, which states in relevant part that
"prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
would enable [the aims of cessation of violations and bringing violators to justice] to be
achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace .
I...
Id. The term
"reconciliation" does not appear as a stated goal but is implied in context. The statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted a year and a half after the ICTY Statute,
explicitly links prosecutions to reconciliation. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998) ("Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
would ... contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace..."). The Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid tribunal created by the
UN and the government of Sierra Leone, also links prosecutions to reconciliation. The preamble to this statute notes that "a credible system of justice and accountability for the very
serious crimes committed ... [in Sierra Leone] would end impunity and would contribute to
the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace." S.C.
Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). The preamble to the statute for the International Criminal Court states that the most serious crimes shock the
"conscience of humanity" and justifies the new institution as a means to end impunity for
these atrocities and deter their commission; like the ICTY statute, the link between prosecution and reconciliation is implied. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, A/CONE 183/9.
2.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has articulated criteria for determining whether
an adjudicative mechanism is an international court. Prosecutor Against Charles Ghankay
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeals Chamber (May 31, 2004). It held that international courts may be established through a variety of mechanisms including Security Counsel
resolutions adopted pursuant to its Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter, as well as agreements between the UN and national governments, like Sierra Leone. Id. 37. The Special
Court held that the Security Council may act pursuant to articles 39 (enabling determinations
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create the ICTY ushered in a new stage in the development of international legalism. With the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), the international community has created a permanent tribunal poised to displace the cynical presumption of impunity for mass
atrocities with the legal demand for accountability. One assumption that
undergirds these institutions is that there is a connection between holding individual perpetrators of violence criminally liable for their actions
and the willingness of members of communities pitted against each other
to reconcile-a term used here to refer to the willingness of those formerly divided to leave off violent struggle and to embrace a collective
future.3 For some, trials may engender a willingness to reunite with their
enemies. However, the processes of international justice are not in and of
themselves sufficient to secure these ambitious goals. Under particular
circumstances, studies have found that international criminal trials contribute to individual willingness to reconcile.4 Yet this Article argues that
international criminal trials are encumbered by juridical entailments that
work counter to the project of reconciliation.
International criminal adjudication applies the normative rules
established by the particular tribunal within the accepted conventions of
legal due process. A bedrock principle of this legal framework is
punishing individuals who have violated specific behavioralnorms of a
magnitude that warrants punishment and loss of liberty. Consequently,
international criminal justice mechanisms take up as subjects those
of threats to peace) and 41 (empowering the Security Council to decide measures to give effect to its decisions) of the Charter to establish a court. Id. 38. The court observed that the
Special Court was created by the Security Council acting on behalf of the international community to "fulfill an international mandate and is part of the machinery of international
justice." Id. 39.
3.
The term "reconciliation" is used variously by those writing about mass violence
but commonly connotes forgiveness of past abuses and crimes coupled with renewed cooperation or reunion at the individual and group levels. See Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover,
Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclamation, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY

4-5, 13 (Eric Stover et al. eds., 2004)

[hereinafter MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY]; Miklos Biro et al., Attitudes Toward Justice and
Social Reconstruction in Bosnia andHerzegovina and Croatia, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY,
supra at 195 [hereinafter Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction] (research in
South Africa finding that the word "reconciliation" is most frequently associated with "forgiveness").
4.
In a survey conducted in three war-torn cities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina-Vukovar, Mostar, and Prijedor-researchers found that for those who had prior
interethnic relationships, believed in war crimes trials, and had a positive opinion of the ICTY,
trials contributed to their readiness to reconcile. Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 198; see also Timothy Longman et al., Connecting Justice to
Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconstruction in Rwanda, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 219-24 (finding more positive than negative attitudes
toward trials, but only a limited relationship between attitudes toward trials and willingness to
reconcile) [hereinafter Connecting Justice to Human Experience].
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accused of responsibility for grave violations of international law. And
individual accountability serves to organize discussion of the past-and
plans for the future-around the legal (as opposed to moral) concepts of
guilt and innocence. Left outside of the legal definition of international
crimes are bystanders to these egregious acts: the vast majority of
individuals who are members of communities impacted by war but who
are neither victims nor perpetrators of crimes. Yet bystanders are a
critical segment that must engage in the social and political processes of
reclaiming and rebuilding communities after the bloodshed and as such
are one of the audiences to which the enterprise of international justice is
directed. International humanitarian law cannot and should not
criminalize the conduct of bystanders. Neither subjects nor objects of
criminal trials, bystanders illustrate a challenge to law as a vehicle to
establish the roles (victim/perpetrator) in and responsibilities
(guilt/innocence) for serious violations of international criminal law.
A prior examination of the contribution of international accountability to promoting reconciliation, conducted by myself and Harvey
Weinstein,5 led us to conclude that trials are only one component of an
appropriate and necessary response to mass violence. We proposed a
model of the components needed at multiple levels of society to achieve
social reconstruction-a term that refers to "a process that reaffirms and
develops a society and its institutions based on shared values and human
rights" 6-and this framework was further elaborated and informed by

5.
This work began with a study of the attitudes of legal professionals in Bosnia and
Herzegovina toward the ICTY Human Rights Center, International Human Rights Law Clinic,
and Center for Human Rights, Justice, Accountability, and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERK. J. INT'L L. 102 (2002) [hereinafter Judges
Study]. Drawing on the empirical data, we developed a model to explain the relationship of
criminal trials to other programs and activities necessary to rebuild communities after mass
violence. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002) [hereinafter Violence and Social Repair]. We also examined the relationship between the political and social
dimensions of the ICTY and the ability of its work to contribute to reconciliation and its relationship to the prosecution of war criminals in the national judicial system. Laurel E. Fletcher
and Harvey M. Weinstein, A World Unto Itself? The Application of InternationalJustice in the
former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 29-48 [hereinafter A World
Unto Itself?].
6.
Weinstein & Stover, Introduction, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 5.
Critically, social reconstruction does not require that individuals forgive those who have
wronged them for peace and social stability to be restored. The author subscribes to the conceptual framework developed by researchers engaged in the study undertaken by U.C.
Berkeley's Human Rights Center that emphasizes an expanded list of activities beyond justice
(largely defined as trials or truth commissions) that may promote social adhesion after ethnic
conflict: "[Social reconstruction] is a process that includes a broad range of programmatic
interventions, such as security, freedom of movement, access to accurate and unbiased information, the rule of law, justice, education for democracy, economic development, cross-ethnic
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additional empirical studies in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.7 This
Article extends our previous analysis of the role international tribunals
play to help communities reckon with a violent period in order to scrutinize how law and courts relate to bystanders. This Article contributes to
the scholarship on transitional justice by examining how the legal architecture and operation of international criminal law constricts bystanders
as subjects of jurisprudence, considering the effects of this limitation on
the ability of international tribunals to promote their social and political
goals, and proposing institutional reforms needed to address this limitation.
Part H of this Article provides the theoretic and analytic framework
for examining the legal relationship of bystanders to mass atrocity. It
begins by explaining why, given the ambitions for international justice,
bystanders pose a problem for legal institutions that attribute guilt and
mete out punishment for mass atrocities. Conventional legal approaches
of the international community to address mass violence are also reviewed. In establishing the context for this inquiry, this section discusses
why the charge of crimes against humanity provides an appropriate
framework for examining the bystander problem in law. Part III is a case
analysis of Prosecutor v. Simik et al.,8 the trial of one of the highestranking civilians convicted of crimes against humanity committed during
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This section explores how and to
what extent international criminal trials produce a record that frames the
role of bystanders in a way that promotes social reconstruction among
this group. It concludes that liberal law principles structure trials so as to
render these proceedings equivocal interventions, capable of assisting
certain types of bystanders (the silent bystanders who turned away or
who morally opposed the criminal leadership but did not act) and not
engagement, that work together and at multiple levels of society-the individual, neighborhood, community, and state-to address the factors that led to the conflict." Id.
7.
Urusaro Alice Karekezi et al., Localizing Justice: Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 69-84, Eric Stover, Witnesses and the
Promise of Justice in The Hague, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 104-120;
Dinka Corkalo et al., NeighborsAgain? Intercommunity Relations After Ethnic Cleansing, in
My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 143-61; Timothy Longman & Thdon~ste
Rutagengwa, Memory,Identity, and Community in Rwanda, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY,
supra note 3, at 162-82; Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at
183-205; ConnectingJustice to Human Experience, supra note 4, at 206-25; Sarah Warshauer
Freedman et al., Public Education and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 226-47; Sarah Warshauer Freedman
et al., Confronting the Past in Rwandan Schools, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3,
at 248-66; Dean Ajdukovic & Dinka Corkalo, Trust and Betrayal in War, in My NEIGHBOR,
MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 287-302.
Prosecutor v. Simid et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T [hereinafter Simi6]. The case was
8.
before Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba, Presiding, Judge Sharon A. Williams,
and Judge Per-Johan Lindholm.
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others (the complicit bystanders who passively supported the leaders
now in the dock). Part IV proposes that international justice mechanisms
implement a model of operating as a judicial body while simultaneously
attending to the social impact of their work. By adopting "institutional
dualism," tribunals may address their negative impacts on social reconstruction. Two specific reforms should be considered. First, tribunal
judges should draft their opinions in a manner that explicitly leaves open
the question of bystander contribution to atrocities. Second, tribunals
should act outside the courtroom-through outreach programs and in
conjunction with other institutions-to engage bystanders directly as a
target audience. International tribunals currently are under-connected to
other initiatives to promote social reconstruction. To maximize their impact, tribunals must attend to the social and political impacts with which
legalism's response to mass atrocity is freighted.
II.

BYSTANDERS, ATROCITIES, AND THE LAW

A. InternationalJustice and Social Reconstruction
In 1993, while conflict raged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN
Security Council established the ICTY to prosecute those responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during
the war. The Statute for the Tribunal reflected the determination of UN
diplomats that trials were a necessary response to the bloodshed9 and
marked the first time the international community had acted to hold individuals accountable for mass violence since the end of the Second
World War. The Statute's preamble justifies the creation of the Tribunal
by citing the need to punish offenders and to deter future criminal acts,'t
themes that figure prominently in the debates leading to the vote to establish the ICTY" The Statute, established under Chapter VII of the UN
9.
While the record of the UN Security Council discussion when it voted to create the
Tribunal emphasizes the moral imperative to bring perpetrators to justice, it cannot be overlooked that this same body directed what may be described as anemic military engagement to
end the fighting and the decision to conduct trials has been criticized as a "figleaf' to avoid
direct intervention in the conflict. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 206-08 (2000).
10.
ICTY Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
11.
Diplomats spoke forcefully for the need of the international community to punish
perpetrators of the atrocities committed in the ongoing Balkan war. Brazil's representative to
the UN Security Council, the first to speak, voted in favor of the Tribunal because "prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of these crimes is a matter of high moral duty."
VIRGINIA MORRIS &

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALY-

SIS 161 (1995). The French representative echoed this sentiment: "Prosecuting the guilty is
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Charter, also justifies international prosecutions as necessary contributions to the restoration and maintenance of peace.1 2 The link between
trials and peace has been interpreted by many, notably the first president
of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, as more than simply the cessation of hostilities: justice will contribute to reconciliation.' 3
Much of the literature on international courts supports these institutions on similar grounds, though with varying emphases. 4 For some, like
necessary if we are to do justice to the victims and the international community. Prosecuting
the guilty will also send a clear message to those who continue to commit these crimes that
they will be held responsible for their acts." Id. at 163. The U.S. Ambassador, Madeline Albright, observed that adoption of the statute for the Tribunal affirmed the Nuremburg
Principles: "The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken
hold...." Id. at 165. The British representative intoned that "perpetrators must be called to
account, whoever is responsible ....Those who have perpetrated these shocking breaches of
international humanitarian law should be left in no doubt that they will be held individually
responsible for their actions." Id. at 167. From the Russian Federation representative came the
observation that: "Murder, rape and 'ethnic cleansing' must cease immediately, and the guilty
...must be duly punished." Id. at 168.
12.
ICTY Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
13.
Cassese enumerates four justifications for war crimes trials: (1) trials "establish
individual responsibility over collective assignation of guilt;" (2) 'Justice dissipates the call
for revenge" on the part of victims; (3) "by dint of dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled with their erstwhile tormentors, because they know the latter have now
paid for their crimes; and (4) trials establish a "fully reliable record" of the violence to enshrine the truth about the past for future generations." Antonio Cassese, Reflections on
InternationalCriminalJustice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (emphasis added). Legal scholar
Rudi Teitel observed that the "essential mission of the ICTY is to transform the conflict in the
Balkans to one of individual crimes answerable to the rule of law, and so to achieve peace and
reconciliation" (a goal that she argues is undermined by the lack of national development of
rule of law). Rudi Teitel, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYBURG TO BOSNIA 177 (Carla Hesse et al. eds., 1999); see also
BASS, supra note 9, at 6 ("The treatment of humbled or defeated enemy leaders and war criminals can make the difference between war and peace."). A recent article proposes that
accountability mechanisms should be implemented only in the context of political bargaining
to better ensure acceptance of the norms, strengthen justice institutions, and contain perpetrators. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in
Strategies of InternationalJustice, 28 INT'L SEC. 5 (2004); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE 170 (1997) ("Justice in itself is
not a problematic objective, but whether that attainment of justice always contributes to reconciliation is anything but evident.").
14.
A former ICTY prosecutor and scholar assessed the literature regarding the ICC
and international criminal law as "celebratory" in tone and focused on "reaffirmation of the
assumptions and principles" of international criminal justice or emerging procedural issues;
lacking is investigation of how prosecutions impact deterrence and post-conflict peace building. Payam Akhavan, The InternationalCriminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and
Local in the Age of Accountability, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 720 (2003) (review essay). In the
introduction to a volume devoted to the topic of accountability for international crimes and
serious violations of human rights published in 1996, legal scholar M. Chefif Bassiouni argues
against impunity for these violations and captures the moral justification for accountability
simply: "if you want peace, you must work for justice." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1996); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is The Proliferation of InternationalCourts and TribunalsA Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
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Aryeh Neier, a founder and former executive director of the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch, the ability of the ICTY to
exact punishment constitutes its primary contribution.' 5 Others argue that
trials promote deterrence; would-be violators will curb their brutal tactics to avoid indictment before an international tribunal. 6 The success of
the ICTY and other international mechanisms of accountability in
achieving these objectives depends in part on their ability to arrest defendants, obtain evidence, and secure convictions. 7 To observe that the
679, 688 (1999) ("[I]t is an article of faith among most international lawyers that the growing
availability and use of international tribunals advances the rule of law in international relations") (citing John Bolton, Reject and Oppose the InternationalCriminal Court, in TOWARD
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 37-8 (Alton Frye ed., 1999)); Bartam S. Brown, U.S.
Objections to the Statute of the International CriminalCourt: A BriefResponse, 31 N.YU. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 855 (1999). However, some scholars have questioned the appropriateness of
international trials as a response to mass violence. See Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of
Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 458-68, 481-82 (1999) (questioning
whether international justice is appropriate for building rule of law in Rwanda); Mark A.
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 539 (2005) (arguing that the qualitative difference of mass atrocities requires
distinct theory of punishment for these crimes).

15.

ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE

FOR JUSTICE xii-xiii (1998); Aryeh Neier, Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and
Rwanda, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA, supra note
13, at 42.
16.
In adopting the ICTY statute, UN Security Council members expressed their belief
that prosecutions would deter perpetrators from committing further atrocities. U.S. Ambassador Madeline Albright stated the Tribunal would promote justice "and deter further atrocities
in the former Yugoslavia." MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 11, at 165. The Spanish ambassador
remarked that accountability would "deter the repetition of similar acts in the future." Id. at
172. The first prosecutor for the ICTY, Justice Richard Goldstone, states that "the only deterrent against war crimes.., is ... a probability that [potential war criminals will] be brought to
account." Richard Goldstone, 1998 Otto L Walter Lecture, InternationalHuman Rights at
Century's End, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 241, 254 (1999). Writing eight years after the
Tribunal was created, Payam Akhavan argued that prosecutions by the ad hoc tribunals stigmatized the political leaders responsible for the violence and contributed to the long-term
development of a political climate that would prevent recurrence of bloodshed. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can InternationalCriminalJustice Prevent Future Atrcities?, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 7, 10 (2001). Other scholars have cautioned that political leaders determined to
pursue criminal policies are unlikely to be thrown off course by the threat of prosecution.
BASS, supra note 9, at 290-95; CARLOS NINO. RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
17.
A former judge at the ICTY, Patricia Wald, cautioned that the efficacy of ad hoc
tribunals has been hampered by the length of trials, high administrative costs, and insufficient
outreach efforts to communities, which is made more difficult by the remote location of the
tribunals. Patricia M. Wald, Accountabilityfor War Crimes: What Roles for National,International and Hybrid Tribunals?,ABIINFORM GLOBAL, 181, 192-93 (2004). Justice Goldstone
chronicled the problems he confronted when establishing the first functioning international
criminal tribunal, including the challenge to navigate the UN bureaucracy to establish a working office, inadequate funding for the enterprise, and the lack of cooperation from NATO
countries to arrest accused war criminals. RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 85-88, 104-06, 116-17 (2000); see also Susan W.
Tiefenbrun, The Paradox of InternationalAdjudication: Developments in the International
Criminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the Interna-
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ICTY and international accountability mechanisms may achieve limited
success in pursuing these objectives does not necessarily detract from
the normative aspirations of these institutions. The relative success in
and value of pursuing these goals is beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather the focus of this analysis is the claim that international justice can
and should promote social reconstruction. To lay the framework for this
inquiry, a few concepts and background data are introduced below.
1. Data on Justice and Reconciliation
Assertions that ICTY prosecutions promote reconciliation within the
Balkans rest on several assumptions. One is the theory that criminal trials of individuals will isolate and stigmatize the defendants as criminals
separate and apart from the national group to which they belongBosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, or Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims). 8 Differentiating the "bad" perpetrators from the "innocent" members of the same
nationality is thought to prevent public attribution of collective guilt and
permit individuals to rebuild communal ties. Through adjudication, judicial proceedings differentiate between wrongdoers and collectives,
acknowledge crimes committed, and produce a record that lays the foundation for a national consensus as to what happened and who is
responsible for the criminal suffering so that communities may rebuild.' 9
tional Criminal Court, 25 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 551, 582-83 (2000) (arguing that the
failure to extradite indicted war criminals undermines the efficacy of the Tribunal).
18.
Cassese, supra note 13, at 6; Justice Goldstone also subscribed to this theory, stating that trials would break the cycle of violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by
holding individuals accountable: "Specific individuals bear the major share of the responsibility, and it is they, not the group as a whole, who need to be held to account ... so that the next
time around none will be able to claim that all Serbs did this, or all Croats ... so that people
are able to see how.. . specific individuals in their communities ... are continually endeavor-

ing to manipulate them... " ERIC

STOVER & GILLES PERESS, THE GRAVES: SREBRENICA AND
VUKOVAR 138 (1998) (reference omitted); IGNATIEFF, supra note 13, at 178 ("The most impor-

tant task of war crimes trials is to 'individualize' guilt, to relocate it from the collectivity to the
individuals responsible."); Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 741-42 (1998) (arguing that the ICTY can "demonstrat[e] that
individuals-primarily leaders-bear liability for crimes, and that there is no justification for
the collective attribution of guilt to entire ethnic groups"). For a summary of how diplomats
have applied this argument for individual accountability to mass violence in the 20th Century,
see BASS, supra note 9, at 297-301.
19.
Cassese, supra note 13, at 6; Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia?, supra note 18, at 741-42, 770 (arguing that the ICTY can help generate a national consensus about what occurred during the war, but for the factual record to contribute to
reconciliation, it will have to be accepted by those living within the region); BASS, supra note
9, at 304 ("The absence of a well-established historical record facilitates denial that atrocities
ever happened.... The Hague can fight that."); Teitel, supra note 13, at 182 (explaining how
ICTY indictments create a "historical truth" about the atrocities that has ambiguous impact on
bringing about peace). Michael Ignatieff argues that trials may produce a truth that will aid
public reckoning, but only when there is the political will to support a discussion about a
shameful past. IGNATIEFF, supra note 13, at 179-89.
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Unfortunately, these assumptions remain largely untested. The relationship between international court opinions that articulate international
criminal law norms and produce a judicial record of the past on the one
hand, and the social and political impact of these rulings in the communities directly affected by mass violence on the other hand, has not been
adequately documented or theorized. 20 Scholars have devoted relatively
little attention to the fundamental principles or assumptions upon which
this faith in the ascendance of accountability for gross human rights violations is based. 21 This shortcoming has been compounded by a dearth of
empirical work regarding the ability of international justice mechanisms
to promote peace and stability in the regions affected by the violence. In
fact, the lack of critical inspection of the redemptive assumptions of international criminal tribunals has obscured the need for a model of
transitional justice that can live up to the aspirations of these institutions.
A recent study by the Human Rights Center at the University of
California, Berkeley contributes important empirical data to this endeavor. During a five-year, multidisciplinary study in Bosnia and
Rwanda, researchers found that within communities emerging from the
breakdown in social order that accompanies atrocity, "there is no direct
link between criminal trials (international, national, and local/traditional)
and reconciliation," but allowed that attitudes may change over time. 2
Community members did not associate criminal sanctions with their
willingness to reconcile with members of the national group in whose
name violations were committed.23 Rather, reconciliation was a private
process that occurred between individuals.24 Most did not equate justice
simply with punishment of wrongdoers but defined the term more
broadly to include return of property, reparations, and the need for economic development. Their ideas about punishment were expansive. They
thought it should include all wrongdoers-the big fish as well as the local

20.

Akhavan, The InternationalCriminal Court in Context, supra note 14, at 720.
Id.; see Weinstein & Stover, Introduction, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note
3, at 4 ("A primary weakness of writings on justice in the aftermath of war and political violence is the paucity of objective evidence to substantiate claims about how well criminal trials
or other accountability mechanisms achieve the goals ascribed to them."); Violence and Social
Repair supra note 5, at 584-85.
22.
Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe
of Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 323 [hereinafter A Common
Objective, A Universe of Alternatives]. One empirical study of attitudes of Bosnian Serbs
toward criminal accountability and social reconstruction indicates that most see themselves
and their community as victimized by the conflict and unfairly singled out for approbation by
the ICTY. Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 183, 192-95,
200.
23.
A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, supra note 22, at 323.
24.
Id.

21.
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small fry. 25 The study also suggested that priorities for social reconstruction differ among individuals and communities and that trials comprise
only one component of a multidimensional strategy necessary to bring
about conditions under which divided communities may readhere.
2. Ecological Model of Social Reconstruction
Drawing from the data of the study and utilizing research of community and developmental psychologists, Professor Harvey Weinstein
and I have developed an ecological model of social reconstruction to
explain the importance and interrelation of multiple activities and institutions in restoring stability and strength to a social fabric damaged by
interethnic conflict.2 6 Mass atrocity causes damage in many dimensions

of human experience: loss of loved ones, jobs, political institutions and
arrangements, and social networks. Each of these losses needs to be addressed. Thus, social reconstruction includes programs that promote
justice, establish democracy, bring about economic prosperity and transformation, and enable reconciliation to occur at the individual level."
The components of the social system are linked and changes to any one
part will reverberate throughout. Those engaged in fixing one dimension
must be aware that their actions will have impacts-intended and unintended-in other dimensions. For example, as we have seen, initiating
28
war crimes prosecutions during a war will impact peace negotiations. It

is important that those engaged in social reconstruction understand their
work does not take place in isolation but rather is part of a larger, dynamic framework of activities.
Id. at 323-34.
25.
See Violence and Social Repair, supra note 5.
26.
Id. at 623. In Sierra Leone, the simultaneous operation of a trth and reconciliation
27.
commission alongside a criminal tribunal appears to have proceeded successfully, and many
anticipated procedural and institutional conflicts did not transpire. William A. Schabas, A
Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 15 CRIM. L. FORUM 3, 5-6 (2004) (arguing that despite tension between the two, the "real lesson" of the parallel existence of the accountability
mechanisms is that courts and trth commissions "can work productively together ..").Indeed contrary to expectations, perpetrators testified before the commission in spite of the risk
they could be subject to prosecution by the court, suggesting that truth commissions do not
necessarily thwart prosecutions. Id. at 30.
The indictments of Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzi6 and Ratko Mladi6 for
28.
genocide and crimes against humanity on July 25, 1995, fundamentally altered the manner in
which political negotiations could occur as countries shied from meeting openly with indicted
war criminals. BAss, supra note 9, at 229-31. Tribunals may also engender a backlash against
international justice. For example, nationalist politicians in Croatia exploited the ICTY for
political gain by portraying cooperation with the Tribunal as selling out national war heroes.
Victor Peskin & Mieczysraw P. Boduszyhski, International Justice and Domestic Politics:
Post-Tudjman Croatiaand the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 55
EURO.-AsIA STUD. 1117 (2003).
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The ecological model does not prescribe a one-size-fits-all set of
policies or interventions. Rather, it requires a contextual approach to social repair that incorporates common features of the individual's
experience of mass violence:
[Blecause each individual is uniquely situated vis-A-vis each
component [of social reconstruction] and further, the needs for
repair vary based on experience, no single intervention can aspire to address the needs of a diverse population. Thus, the
process of social reconstruction must attend to restoration of basic security while at the same time building a consensus about
historical record, punishing perpetrators, honoring the memory
of the missing or dead, rebuilding infrastructure so as to enable
commerce, and allowing communities to resurrect or build a
framework for cooperation among the difference groups. Any
single [objective] ... must respond to the individual's relationship to the violence, whether as victim, perpetrator, bystander, or
rescuer.29
International criminal trials are one option among the variety of accountability mechanisms that may be employed to advance one
component-justice--of social reconstruction. Domestic or hybrid tribunals, truth commissions, lustration programs, and reparations are
additional options to be considered, perhaps in conjunction with international trials.3 °
Social reconstruction is a process and an outcome that takes place at
multiple sites and under particular conditions. Human Rights Center researchers Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein have elaborated the
ecological model based on their complete study data. They suggest that
social reconstruction should take into account the opinions and priorities
of the affected population; takes place at varying rates across social sectors; should be implemented by authorities perceived as legitimate by the
target audience; will be influenced by the political nature of past regimes
(Communist, post-colonial, etc.); requires that all components of social
reconstruction work in synergy; and must engage all levels of society29.
Violence and Social Repair, supra note 5, at 625. The components of social reconstruction have been more recently articulated, with the benefit of all the research data, as
comprising eight components: (1) security; (2) freedom of movement; (3) the rule of law;
(4) access to accurate and unbiased information; (5) justice; (6) education for democracy;
(7) economic development; and (8) cross-ethnic engagements. A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, supra note 22, at 327-39.
30.
For a recent review of the development and trends in accountability mechanisms,
see Ivan Simonovid, Comment, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and
Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 343 (2004).
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individual, community, society, and state.' In addition, the potential for
and nature of social reconstruction will be impacted by the nature of the
violence. For example, the challenges for social reconstruction are different in Rwanda, where Hutu and Tutsi continue to live side-by-side,
than they are in Bosnia or Germany, where the targeted ethnic or national groups largely have been segregated or eliminated.
Moreover, the experience of the individual in mass atrocity must also
guide the implementation of social reconstruction programs. In addition
to the above features and conditions, Weinstein and I argued that comprehensive intervention to promote social reconstruction must address
the individual's relation to social breakdown. We asserted that not only
must the processes that led to mass violence be reversed, but the individual's experience of social breakdown also should be addressed. Thus,
activities and programs to promote social reconstruction should address
three aspects of the relationship of the individual to mass violence. First,
interventions must acknowledge the loss the individual experienced.
Second, interventions should seek to restore a sense of mastery and control over one's life. Finally, efforts to promote social reconstruction
should encourage acknowledgement by the individual of his or her relationship to the horrors.32 The ability of any particular intervention to
address the three features of an individual's experience of mass violence
will vary. For example, economic development and restoration of livelihoods are components of social reconstruction, but these activities
operate more to directly return to individuals a measure of control over
their lives than to confront them with their relationship to mass violence-as perpetrators, victims, or bystanders. Criminal convictions
punish wrongdoers, but do not seek to directly restore control to victims
over their lives (though retribution may provide them a measure of relieD). Each program will have particular objectives and emphases.
What the ecological model requires is that each initiative-whether
to advance justice or another component-takes into account the panoply of programs operating at different levels to address social
reconstruction and responds to the relationship of the individual to social
breakdown. The primary contribution of trials is that they provide a
measure of accountability for the violations committed. However, they
are not equipped to accomplish all the work of social reconstruction. As
this Article suggests, international criminal trials are not designed to address the relationship of bystanders to mass violence, which raises
important concerns for their ability to promote social reconstruction.
Thus, accountability mechanisms must understand their limitations and
31.
32.

A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, supra note 22, at 325-27.
Violence and Social Repair supra note 5, at 623.
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work in tandem with other programs to further these broader social
goals.33 Scholars and researchers have begun to temper, or clarify, expectations of the contribution of international trials to social reconstruction
in light of concerns raised by the experiences of tribunals.34 Yet the question remains: what can trials do-within their limits-to promote social
repair?
3. Bystanders
The protagonists of international criminal trials are the accused and
victims. Punishment and justice acknowledge the relationship of perpetrators and victims to the processes that lead to mass violence. Yet in the
case of mass violence, there is another category implicated in the events,
even if it is not an explicit focus of proceedings: bystanders. Mass violence relies on a social apparatus to execute its bloody aims. Political
leaders count on a measure of popular support to achieve power (and
even military dictatorships depend on a degree of cooperation from segments of civil society). Once mass killing starts, one scholar reviewing
the literature on bystanders has concluded, "the majority will either willingly join the violence, or they will comply, submit, and remain passive
when faced with brutality.' 35 In other words, those who orchestrate mass
violence are aided by the failure of spectators to intervene. In this con33.
For example, special measures to promote community-level reconciliation are part
of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor. Sections 22-23,
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 20001/10,
UNTAET/Reg/2001/10 (July 13, 2001). Wrongdoers of non-serious crimes may submit a statement of their acts and will be required to perform "community reconciliation acts". Id. For
a
discussion of this program, see Fausto Belo Ximenes, The Unique Contributionof the Community-Based Reconciliation Process in East imor, May 28, 2004, at http:// www.easttimorreconciliation.org/jsmpReport-prk-summary.html.
34.
Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity,
Diane Orentlicher, 61st Sess., Agenda Item 17, 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (2005) ("recent developments have strongly affirmed a central premise of the Principles-'the need for
a
comprehensive approach towards combating impunity'"); Commission on Human Rights,
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, 60th Sess., Agenda Item 17, para. 10,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88 (Feb. 27, 2004) ("An effective [anti-impunity] policy requires
a
multifaceted strategy, with each component playing a necessary but only partial role.");
A
Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, supra note 22, at 335. See Drumbl, supra note
14; Patricia M. Wald, supra note 17; Diane Amann, Assessing InternationalCriminalAdjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 169 (2000-2003); Akhavan,
The InternationalCriminal Court in Context, supra note 14, at 721. Researchers have not yet
developed a method to measure the various components of social reconstruction that we have
identified (justice, democracy, economic prosperity, and transformation). Further research
in
this area is needed to define these components sufficiently so that they may be measured and
their relative contributions assessed.
35.
STEVEN JAMES BARTLETT, THE PATHOLOGY OF MAN: A STUDY OF HUMAN
EVIL
177 (2005).
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text, "doing nothing" is "doing something"-bystanders are thus an integral part of the killing apparatus.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a bystander as "a person who
36
is present at an event or incident but does not take part." In the context
of mass violence, bystanders are those who did not participate in crimes
but nonetheless did not intervene to stop the carnage. They may have
been silent supporters or opponents of the political and military forces
that waged the war, but their role in the events is defined by their inaction and passivity.17 As their country and community became engulfed in
war, regardless of their private opinions about the political fissures, they
remained onlookers, quiescent or acquiescent witnesses to the social
breakdown of their communities. And when the political battles turned
violent, they remained spectators who, by virtue of living in the country
during the war, played a role in the terror and have a stake in their country's future.38
Bystanders play a role in the descent of their communities into violence. And they will inform the way their children, friends, and
colleagues perceive the past. The choices bystanders make about how to
remember what happened will shape the future of their communities.
Bystanders can become guardians against a return to violence or they
can throw their support behind efforts to destabilize peace. Bystanders
are therefore a critical target of efforts to promote social reconstruction.
Their relationship to trials-along with their engagement with the other
components of social reconstruction-will facilitate or obstruct the goal
of restoring social stability. Thus, a goal of rebuilding communities after
conflict should be to promote bystanders as active participants in reforming social, economic, and political networks that support human rights
and the rule of law.
36.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

37.

Bartlett summarized the bystander phenomenon as follows:

There exist two distinct and complementary ways in which most human beings react to mass killing once it starts: to join in the fray, or turn their heads the other

way. Relatively few... resist mass killing. The majority will either willingly join in
the violence, or they will comply, submit, and remain passive when faced by brutality.... It is often difficult to distinguish between simple passivity and silent
complicity, since the behavioral manifestations of both attitudes are the same: inaction and absence of protest.

supra note 35, at 177.
The primary distinction between bystanders defined for this article and narrower,
38.
and perhaps more ambiguous categories of marginal participants who might be thought of as
"bystanders" under tort law (i.e., those who are present when another is in distress)-war
profiteers, low level public servants, informants-is that bystanders to mass violence did not
play an active role in enabling or profiting from the violence and, equally important, did not
BARTLETT,

oppose the wrongdoers.

1028

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 26:1013

4. Bystanders and Trials
The ICTY experience illustrates how an international tribunal, the
first president of which understood that part of its work was to advance
broader social goals, developed mechanisms and utilized rhetoric to
meet these objectives. The history of the Tribunal also alerts us to the
potential pitfalls of such efforts. The international community has
adapted international accountability mechanisms to address some of
these pitfalls, which have emerged as these institutions seek to make
their work relevant in the countries where the violence occurred. The
development of hybrid tribunals in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and East
Timor addresses the perceptions of those in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda that the tribunals located in The Hague and Arusha have little
relevance to their struggle to rebuild communities.39 And the new Inter-

national Criminal Court provides for greater involvement by victims and
witnesses to address popular perceptions that international tribunals have
failed to prioritize the needs of these groups in the pursuit of justice.
While these innovations are important and history will judge their success, less attention has been paid to how trials of international crimes
respond to the relationship of bystanders to mass violence and how such
trials can promote social reconstruction among this critical group.
Weinstein and I have argued that international criminal trials address
the dimensions of an individual's relation to social breakdown. Violators
are punished for their actions and those harmed receive acknowledgement of their loss and status as victims.4° Trials may remove criminal
leaders from power, thus enabling communities to reestablish control'
International criminal trials are powerful symbols that convey moral,
social, as well as legal approbation of the guilty and the political objec-

39.
The Human Rights Center surveys in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda indicated that residents in those countries supported the idea of justice, but held negative
views of
the ad hoc tribunals. Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note
3, at 193
(Serb and Croat respondents felt that the ICTY was biased against their national group);
Connecting Justice to Human Experience, supra note 4, at 213 (showing 87% of those
surveyed
were not informed of the work of the tribunal). However, both ad hoc tribunals were
created
when security conditions in each country were thought to prevent safe operation of
the tribunals and therefore required a location outside the region. For an assessment of
the hybrid
tribunals in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, see Suzannah Linton, Cambodia,
East
limor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.
FORUM 185
(2001).
40.
Violence and Social Repair, supra note 5, at 628.
41.
Id. Akhavan reviews the effect of the arrest of indicted Croatian and Serbian war
criminals on domestic politics and cautiously concludes that general public acceptance
of the
arrests supports the proposition that international trials are contributing to shifting
cultural
norms toward respect for rule of law. Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 16, at
13-22.
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2
tives that drove them to commit their misdeeds. These accountability
mechanisms produce a record about the past that can generate acknowledgement among victims, perpetrators, and bystanders about
their respective relationships to the violence. For bystanders, such selfreflection may be the first step toward reaching out to victims and
apologizing privately or publicly for the harm survivors suffered. Bystander acknowledgment may also generate support for collective
forms of acknowledgment, such as public apologies, and buttress political will for systemic reforms that strengthen human rights protections
and the rule of law. Yet this last assertion-that trials enable bystander
acknowledgment--deserves closer investigation. Certainly the nature of
the conflict will determine the number of bystanders and their relationship to the violence.43 Taking into consideration the particular context of
the violations and understanding that international accountability plays
a limited role in achieving social reconstruction, this analysis focuses
on how trials can enable bystander acknowledgment of their role in
mass violence and how we can maximize their efficacy in this regard.
Unfortunately, the law itself may unintentionally interfere with realizing this ambition. Why?
International criminal trials constrict the subject of the law's focus
such as to render bystanders virtually invisible. The absence of bystanders as legal subjects has particular consequences for the impact of trials.
One consequence is that trials create a paradox: trials of individuals are
justified as debunking popular calls for collective accountability." Yet the
absence of bystanders in the jurisprudence may mean that individuals
identify with the member of their national group who is a legal subject of
the court-either victim or perpetrator. Where that person is the convicted wrongdoer, bystanders may understand perpetrators as the
symbolic placeholder for "their" member group. Thus, trials may inad45
vertently promote group thinking rather than reduce it. If one aim of
social reconstruction is to encourage bystanders to acknowledge their
Legal scholar Diane Amann has argued that the expressive function of the law-to
42.
articulate societal values-justifies a preference for international over domestic prosecution of
crimes against humanity and genocide. Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism,
and Genocide, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 93, 117-24 (2002).
Organized interethnic conflict in an integrated community produces a different
43.
dynamic than conflict between segregated populations. For example, the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina generated bystanders who watched or silently bore witness to the suffering of
members of the targeted group living in their midst. In contrast, the Darfur conflict is prosecuted by Arab Janjaweed militia which attack African villages. In this situation, the entire
village is under attack and the distinction between victim and bystander more likely is due to
accident than inclination.
Cassese, supra note 13, at 6; Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
44.
Yugoslavia?, supra note 18, at 741-42; BASS, supra note 9, at 297-301.
See Judges Study, supra note 5, at 149.
45.
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relationship to mass violence, how do trials help or hurt this process? Or,
better stated, how do trials help and hurt? Because trials are an important
component of a comprehensive response to mass violence, their limitations-in particular their potential to impede social reconstructionshould be identified so these questions may be addressed. The following
section lays out the limits of law in addressing bystanders in order to
frame further discussion of the symbolic implications of the enforcement
of international criminal law.
B. The Law as an Incomplete Response to Bystanders

Implicated in the violence by their passivity, it is not unreasonable to
ask whether bystanders should pay a price for their inaction. 46 The conventional response is that it would violate fundamental principles of
fairness to impose criminal liability on a group that is morally but not
legally complicit. Legal philosophers and international criminal courts
have advanced this approach and legal and procedural challenges to
change this paradigm have not gained traction. The law's conception and
application of culpability for war crimes is reviewed here to evaluate its
potential to address bystanders. Next, the concern for institutional legitimacy and its impact on the ability of international accountability
mechanisms to address bystanders are discussed. This section concludes
with a review of the charge of crimes against humanity as a prelude to
the case analysis.
1. Liberal Legalism
Philosophers writing about mass violence have provided an influential theoretical lens through which to understand the legal relationship
between bystanders and war crimes. Bystanders have "done" nothing
and therefore fall outside the ambit of criminal sanctions. The law does
not impose a duty to intervene, to rescue, or to prevent harm where doing so poses a risk to oneself. A duty of altruism does not require
sacrifice of one's own welfare. 7 Similarly, German philosopher Karl
46.
Hannah Arendt observed in the context of Nazi Germany that the boundaries between categories of guilt, responsibility, and innocence are blurred: "There are many who
share responsibility without any visible proof of guilt. There are many more who have become
guilty without being in the least responsible. Among the responsible in a broader sense must
be included all those who continued to be sympathetic to Hitler as long as it was possible, who

aided his rise to power, and who applauded him in Germany...."
IN UNDERSTANDING, 1930-1954 125 (1994).

HANNAH ARENDT, ESSAYS

47.
In general, Anglo-American common law jurisdictions do not sanction the failure of
a Good Samaritan to aid another in danger, while continental systems criminalize such fail-

ures.

JOSEPH

W. GLANNON,

THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS

189 (1995).

The duty to rescue does not arise when intervention risks danger or serious injury to the rescuer; thus, this principle would not apply to mass violence. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT
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Jaspers's categorical rejection of criminal liability for the collective guilt
of the German people for the crimes of Nazis has been carried forward
largely unquestioned by contemporary scholars and international lawyers
who have accepted his basic assumption that legal sanction of bystanders
4t
or collectives is antithetical to liberal legalism.
The principles of criminal law confine sanctions to individuals,
based on41 evidence presented according to rules designed to ensure a fair
process. Philosopher Judith Shklar wrote: "The principle of legalitythat there shall be no crime without law, and no punishment without a
crime-is criminal justice."5 Criminal trials are an expression of legalism, a term defined by Shklar to mean "the ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships
5
to consist of duties and rights determined by rules." ' In liberal states,
this attitude assumes legal form through rules that locate the individual
as the central unit of analysis for purposes of sanctioning violation of
social norms. For purposes of this discussion, these concepts are conveyed through the term liberal legalism, which refers to the legal
principles and values that privilege individual autonomy, individuate responsibility, and are reflected in the criminal law of common law legal
systems.

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 314 (1977) (no liability lies for failure to exercise reasonable care in

aiding another where the intervener had no duty to act). In fact, Shklar points out that in Nazi
Germany, "the absence of any moral leadership or guidance from the 'respectable' sections of
society [made] it... perhaps, unreasonable to expect average persons to do anything but 'go
along' with a political movement as all-pervasive and well-established as Nazism was in Germany." ARENDT, supra note 46, at 192. Writing closer to the defeat of National Socialism,
Hannah Arendt concluded that the nature of the administration of mass murder implicated
everyone, rendering intervention suicidal: "[T]he only way in which we can identify an antiNazi is when the Nazis have hanged him. There is no other reliable token." Id. at 124.
While the ad hoc tribunals have utilized legal doctrines that sanction leaders and
48.
key actors for their role in mass atrocities-under theories such as joint criminal enterprise,
command responsibility, and conspiracy-these theories are a far cry from holding bystanders
criminally liable for their role. See Drumbl, supra note 14. The need for a more direct legal
response to bystanders is raised by historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's examination of the
organization and conduct of military personnel involved in the Holocaust. He offers a sharp
rebuke to explanations of the Nazi extermination of the Jews as having been driven by political elites deeply loyal to Hitler's anti-Semitic vision. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996). Based
on review of historical documents, Goldhagen argues that non-politicized, ordinary, soldiers
willingly slaughtered and terrorized Jews. Id. at 450-54. His work raises the question of
whether the symbolism of prosecuting the Nazi leadership made it easier for "ordinary Germans" to avoid introspection of the consequences of their own anti-Semitism.
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
49.
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International CriminalLaw, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75, 82-85 (2005).
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 152 (1964).
50.
Id. at 1.
51.
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Jaspers assumed that any catalytic potential of trials to awaken a
feeling of co-responsibility or contrition among bystanders for the
crimes carried out in their name, while a desirable consequence of international criminal trials, is not a goal that should be taken into
consideration in the judicial process. Jaspers strove to keep the two
spheres of bystander and perpetrator guilt separate, distinguishing them
legally, politically, and morally. Jaspers argued that although German
bystanders during the Nazi era did not have criminal guilt, they did have
moral and metaphysical guilt. Moral guilt attaches to those who, during
the Nazi terror, "went right on with their activities, undisturbed in their
social life and amusements, as if nothing had happened. ' 52 Metaphysical
guilt springs from the intangible interconnection of all human beings that
makes "each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the
world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his
knowledge. 53
Jaspers asserted that criminal trials of the few did not relieve the
metaphysical guilt of the many, but that the individual must wrestle with
his or her conscience about the individual's actions during the conflict.
He saw it as an advantage that the Nuremberg trials addressed the Nazi
leadership and did not put the German people on trial.54 He believed that
acknowledgment by individuals of the role that they played in enabling
atrocities was an ongoing process, one which was essentially separate
and isolated from public trials of political and military leaders. 5 Jaspers
argued that internal reflection could lead to social reconstruction through
a collective project of "renewing human existence," which the German
people faced as a consequence of having been brought "face to face with
nothingness" through the monstrous atrocities perpetrated in their
name. 56
Early advocates of the ICTY echoed Jaspers's sentiments and
thereby framed the public vision for what that body should accomplish.
Antonio Cassese, as president of the Tribunal, argued that among the
52.
KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 73-74 (E.B. Ashton trans.,
1947).
53.
Id. at 32.
54.
Id. at 51-52.
55.
Id. at 43-45.
56.
Id. at 81, 120. Arendt and Jaspers corresponded in the post-war years about the
nature of co-responsibility in the German context. Arendt argued that co-responsibility of the
German people for the Holocaust should take the form of a political response, such as the
right to German nationality for all Jews, wherever born. Jaspers rejected this idea, emphasizing that co-responsibility is primarily a moral orientation. He believed co-responsibility might
lead to political action, but that was analytically a separate category. He lamented that postwar
Germany lacked sufficient moral movement to produce political support for such proposals.
HANNAH ARENDT-KARL JASPERS: CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969 53, 62 (Lotte Kohler et al.
eds., Robert Kimber et al. trans., 1992).,
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advantages of international criminal trials in the context of the Balkan
conflict was that they establish "individual responsibility over collective

assignation of guilt" and provide a record to educate future generations
about the past." In general, commentators writing about the potential
contribution of the ICTY in the first several years after it was established
assumed that those living in the region would understand the formal legal distinction between individual criminal liability and collective guilt
as Judge Cassese and other advocates intended. Through a simplified
understanding of attitude formation, Cassese assumes that once relieved
of collective sanction and freed of criminal leaders, bystanders will undergo internal reflection, reject the political goals that led to violence,
and embrace a future with their former enemies. Though not made as
explicit as Jaspers's, Cassese's theory of the self-reflection bystanders
would undertake in response to trials is consistent with the justifications
tribunal supporters offer for the ICTY and other international criminal
justice mechanisms."
On the other hand, Cassese did not address Jaspers's insight that trials also trigger a defensive rejection of accountability. Jaspers theorized
that because the Nuremberg trials aimed at the Nazi leadership, the
German public understood that the moral legitimacy of the German state
was on trial:
A criminal state is charged against its whole population. Thus
the citizen feels the treatment of his leaders as his own, even if
they are criminals. In their persons the people are also condemned. Thus the indignity and mortification experienced by the
leaders of the state are felt by the people as their own indignity
and mortification.5 9
Although Jaspers's assertions were largely based on theory, the recent
Human Rights Center study lends support to his claim that the association of leaders and civil society creates resistance to trials from
bystanders that hinders the political project of social regeneration. Human Rights Center data suggest that the role international criminal trials
can play to promote bystander acknowledgment of the atrocities committed in their name is limited by a number of factors, including the
dominance of nationalist political parties in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. A study of Bosnian judges and prosecutors carried out by the
Human Rights Center found that individuals from all national groups
57.
Cassese, supra note 13, at 6 (emphasis in original).
58.
STOVER & PERESS, supra note 18, at 138; IGNATIEFF, supra note 13, at 178; Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, supra note 18, at 741-42; BASS,
supra note 9, at 297-301.
59.
JASPERS, supra note 52, at 52.
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define their national group, and by extension themselves, as victims in
the conflict and dismiss trial records that contradict this "truth." 6 The
possibility, however, of attitudes changing over time highlights the importance of6 monitoring popular perceptions of accountability
proceedings .61
Legal philosophy and empirical data on popular perceptions of the
ICTY suggest that the link between individual retribution and social reconstruction presents a challenge to legalism's response to mass
violence. The paradox of international criminal trials for mass violence
is that the purported benefit of excluding bystanders from legal liability
takes away a potent tool for encouraging social regeneration. There is no
organized mechanism for bystanders to confront and acknowledge the
ways in which their inaction or passive participation contributed to the
atrocities conducted in their name. And international justice tribunals are
not well-suited to directly address bystander responsibility. This limitation indicates the importance of other mechanisms, such as truth
commissions, to promote social reconstruction, but also draws attention
to the need to question whether tribunals themselves can do more to
mitigate the effects of this paradox.
One problem tribunals face in this regard is that justice institutions
are constrained from greater legal engagement with these issues. The
insights of Judith Shklar are apt here. She observed that a shortcoming
of the ability of the Nuremberg trials to promote social values was the
ideology of legalism that guided the political decision to put the Nazi
leadership on trial:
The great paradox revealed here is that legalism as an ideology
is too inflexible to recognize the enormous potentialities of legalism as a creative policy, but exhausts itself in intoning
traditional pieties and principles which are incapable of realization. This is, of course, the perennial character of ideologies. It
should not, however, in this case, lead one to forget the greatness
of legalism as an ethos when it expresses itself in the characteristic institutions of the law.62
While Shklar thought the trials made a political contribution to
postwar German reconstruction, this effect was fairly narrow, if significant-i.e., to "reinforce dormant legal consciousness" among the

60.
Judges Study, supra note 5, at 147-49.
61.
See Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 187-91
(social distance between ethnic groups showed some change over two year period of 20002002).
62.
SHKLAR, supra note 50, at 112.
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country's political and bureaucratic classes.63 Yet this Article argues that
bystanders, not just those elite members of communities, deserve attention and are already an undefined target of the broader benefits that
international criminal trials are thought to bestow. However, to the extent
that ICTY judges and former judges have expressed their support for the
contribution that trials can make to promoting broader goals, their motivations have not resulted in a change within the courtroom 64 They have
adhered to the conventional operation of legalism as an ideology.
Reform of the way judges conduct proceedings to more directly address the role of bystanders is unlikely to succeed. One proposed
solution to counteract the narrow focus of accountability proceedings is
offered by legal scholar Mark Osiel. Osiel extends Shklar's insights
about legalism and suggests that judges should exploit the dramatic potential of trials to produce a collective memory about the past and forge a
new national consensus. His proposal requires judges to act with this
goal in mind in admitting evidence, adjudicating rules of procedure, and
applying the rules of professional responsibility. 6 As Osiel notes, his
approach requires judges to act in ways generally thought of as beyond
their professional capacities. 6 And, while his proposal is directed to national judges, there is even greater reason to assume that international
law judges would greet a similar call with great suspicion and reluctance.
Undermined in the early years by lack of resources and dependent
on regional cooperation and NATO forces to arrest indicted defendants
and collect evidence, the ICTY has struggled to establish its institutional
legitimacy. The Tribunal's authority-particularly within the international community--depends on its ability to justify its role as acting as a
court with respect to traditional understandings of the role of courts in
enforcing rules.67 The more expansive use of the courtroom to tell a

drama does not fit well within this traditional conception of its mandate.
Perhaps as tribunals increase their institutional capacity they will produce
a cadre of trained international judges with the expertise in managing
63.
Id. at 156. "The Trial, addressing itself to the political and legal elite, gave that elite
a demonstration of the meaning and value of legalistic politics, not only by offering a decent
model of a trial, a great legalistic drama, but by presenting evidence in a way that the political
elite could not shrug off." Id. at 169.
64.
The ICTY and other international accountability mechanisms have sought to extend
the influence of their proceedings into the impacted communities through outreach programs.
The limits of this model are taken up infra Part IV.B.3.
65.
MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 3 (2000).
66.
Id. at 3-4.
67.
A World Unto Itself supra note 5, at 55; GOLDSTONE, supra note 17, at 123 (noting
that the greatest success of the ad hoc tribunals has been "the acceptance today that an international court is able to dispense justice-that a fair trial before such a tribunal is possible.")
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lengthy, complex trials necessary for increasing the dramaturgic quality of
their proceedings. However, given the demands on judges to apply international criminal law with diligent attention to procedural fairness, in the
near future we should look elsewhere to overcome the limits of liberal
legalism.
2. Theories of Legal Liability
Because procedural reforms are unlikely to increase juridical attention to bystanders, a review of the options under international criminal
law to hold bystanders accountable is in order. International criminal law
offers some possibilities for sanctioning individuals for mass violence in
situations in which they did not commit the offence. However, these doctrines prove inapplicable to punish the behavior of bystanders.
The ICTY has interpreted Article 7(1)61 of its Statute, which establishes individual liability for substantive offenses, to encompass a theory
of joint criminal enterprise. An individual may be held liable under the
theory of joint criminal enterprise for all substantive crimes covered in
the Statute committed as part of a common plan, so long as the defendant participated in the common plan.69 Individuals also may be held

liable under accessorial theories of aiding and abetting in which the defendant is secondarily liable; someone other than the defendant was the
principal who committed the act.70 The distinction between liability for
joint criminal enterprise and accessory liability is that joint criminal enterprise is a theory of liability, while aiding and abetting a crime is
considered contribution to the principal crime and therefore is punishable as a substantive crime. 71 However, assuming that criminal sanction
of bystanders is desirable (e.g., as a symbol to underscore the ways in
68.
ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
69.
The ICTY first recognized this theory in the Tadi6 case. Through subsequent application the joint criminal enterprise theory has assumed a more defined shape. The ICTY has
developed three "types" or theories of this doctrine. The first type requires that perpetrators act
according to a common plan and share a common criminal intent. The second type developed
to respond to liability of concentration camp guards in World War II and requires not that
defendants have a formal agreement, but that they act to further a system of repression. The
third category imposes liability for acts outside the common plan where the defendant intended to participate in the plan and the consequence was foreseeable. Prosecutor v. Tadi6,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
196-204 (July 15, 1999). For a fuller
explication of this theory and its drawbacks see Danner & Martinez, supra note 49; Shane
Darcy, An Effective Measure of Bringing Justice?: The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrineof
the International Criminal Tribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 153
(2004); E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 41-114 (2003).
70.
See Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgment, 373 (Feb. 26, 2001).
71.
Prosecutor v. Furundijia, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment, 296 (Dec. 10, 1998);
VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 69, at 64.
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which bystanders support mass violence), these theories of liability do
not extend to them. Aiders and abettors must have participated in the
offense to a degree such that their actions had "substantial effect" on the
commission of the crime.72 Those who witnessed or lived through mass
violence may have had the requisite mens rea-intending for the killing
to occur or knowing that the atrocities would take place-but they did
not commit the requisite actus reus for joint criminal enterprise liability
to attach or to be considered an aider or abettor.73 Bystanders are defined
in part by their distance from the violence. And bystanders, unlike military commanders, have no duty to take reasonable steps to prevent
violations.74 International criminal law does not sanction those who are
neither leaders nor followers in carrying out mass atrocities, yet who by
virtue of their membership in communities convulsed by violence are
implicated in the past and invested in the future.75
Legal scholar Mark Drumbl responds to the juridical limits of international criminal law by proposing a new form of legal sanction to
punish bystander complicity. Drumbl accepts Jaspers's conclusions that
moral and metaphysical guilt should not be criminalized, but rejects the
idea that "such individuals are blameless, or that they ought to be considered as blameless, or that they are entitled to the law's intervening in a
manner that pronounces their innocence. Trying the most notorious should
not ineluctably lead to absolving the rest., 76 If law sanctions behavior and
72.

GUNAEL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD Hoc TRIBUNALS

284

(2005).
73.
For example, the ICTY case law has defined the mens rea required for commission
of crimes against humanity, a crime that implicates bystanders, as knowledge by the defendant
that his or her act is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. VAN
SLIEDREGT, supra note 69, at 49. As will be discussed in Part I, infra, community members
living through the attack and its aftermath did not commit "acts" that would fall within the
legal ambit of furtherance of the attack, but were merely going about their lives.
Under the doctrine of command responsibility, military or civilian leaders may be
74.
held criminally liable for the criminal acts of their subordinates. For a recent discussion of the
development and current ad hoc jurisprudence on this doctrine, see Danner & Martinez, supra
note 49, at 120-31.
Furthermore, imposing criminal liability on bystanders in the Bosnian war would be
75.
a new crime not contemplated by the Statute and therefore would violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
Drumbl, supra note 14, at 573. Dmmbl argues:
76.
[There is] a middle ground between collective guilt and collective innocence. I call
this middle ground collective responsibility.... But this does not mean that collective responsibility is incapable of sanction. Trials focus on guilt, innocence, blame,
and desert. Law and politics, however, also offer other mechanisms to collectivize
accountability on all members of perpetrator groups for the benefit of all members
of victim groups. These include disgorging the benefits of group violence, compelling community service, redistributing wealth, lustration, subjecting conflict groups
to international administration, and traditional forms of state responsibility such as
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passes over that of bystanders, the law implicitly confers on them legal,
if not moral innocence. Drumbl proposes a form of collective sanction
on communities which generated the leadership for mass violence as a
way to transform bystanders from passive spectators to a potential social
force for restraining conflict in the first instance." Sanctions could assume many forms, including economic sanctions or trade restrictions
against the state or group that initiated the violence, embargoes, taxes,
travel restrictions, and imposition of restorative, commemorative, or reparative measures on the guilty collective in favor of the victims."
Drumbl makes the important point that even if bystanders are not
criminally liable, law should not be enforced in ways that promote a
myth of collective innocence. This leads to the question of what is possible within the existing legal and institutional parameters. Drumbl's
proposal, like Osiel's, requires expansion of the operation of law. Despite the unprecedented growth in international criminal law since the
early 1990s, there is no clearly enforceable norm that contemplates the
legal innovations Drumbl proposes. Nor is it clear whether sanctions or
other direct forms of action that stigmatize or shame collectives will
promote trust and build communities of former enemies. 79 This Article
proposes a more modest approach of evaluating whether the ICTY and
other international criminal tribunals, operating within their current
mandates, can act in ways that will, at a minimum, not promote a myth
of collective innocence and maximally will provide a legal legacy that
enables interventions to engage bystanders.
C. Adjudication ofAtrocities
Research in the Balkans suggests that the capability of accountability
mechanisms to contribute to the public education of bystanders about the
past will depend in part on the perceived legitimacy of the mechanisms
among the targeted populace. 0 This draws our attention to what legal
scholar Robert Post refers to as "questions of legitimation and identity"
embargoes and trade restrictions. These types of sanctions might also serve a preventative role.
Id. at 576-77. He continues: "Since the criminal law does not reach acquiescent group members, they have little incentive to cabin the behavior of conflict entrepreneurs or their reactions
thereto. Group members therefore become unaccountable beneficiaries of the violence instead
of potential gatekeepers." Id. at 577.
77.
Id. at 577.
78.

Mark A. Drumbl, PluralizingInternational Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV.

(forthcoming) (book review).
79.
Weinstein & Stover, Introduction, in My
10-20.
80.

NEIGHBOR,

MY

ENEMY,

supra note 3, at

A Common Objective, A Universe ofAlternatives, supra note 22, at 326.
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for these judicial edifices. 8' Legal philosophers and theorists have addressed the question of the legitimacy of international law from several
perspectives. The analytic positivists like John Austin assumed that there
was no such thing as international law because law depended on "an
edict of a sovereign with power to enforce that law. 82 Other legal philosophers, like H.L.A. Hart, found international law did not require an
enforcement mechanism to justify its existence." International legal
scholar Louis Henkin similarly adopts a functional view and asserts that
international law exists despite the lack of formal governmental structures because it is generally complied with, disputes are resolved, and
through this process law is developed."
Yet Henkin's reliance on international politics to produce the normative values that guide the development and application of international
law85 raises questions about transparency, majoritarianism, and cultural
relativism, to say the least.86 In the case of the ICTY, the Tribunal derives
81.
Post considers the ability of international accountability mechanisms like the ad hoc
tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the ICC to enforce legal norms that are not
generated by an identifiable legislative process that reflects the normative will of the people.
Consequently, Post observes: "Without democratic warrant, it is almost as if the law and its
institutions are expected to rest on their own formal authority. But exactly what is the nature
of that authority?" Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law
Scholarship,2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 329 (2001).
82.
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 3 (1995) (citing JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE

OF JURISPRUDENCE

DETERMINED

1-33 (Legal Classics Library

1985)).

83.

H.L.A.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw

6-13 (1961). Hart accepted the Austinian

principle that law was "a system of order backed up by threats"-the paradigmatic conception
of criminal law-but introduced the concept that substantive norms were integral to a legal
system. He observed that rules among states serve to regulate conduct, provide for standards
which states may invoke to demand compliance and justify countermeasures and reprisals. He
defended the existence of international law by pointing to the evidence of state behavior invoking and utilizing the system of rules despite the absence of a centralized authority capable
of imposing sanctions. Id. at 219, 235, 334-35.
HENKIN, supra note 82, at 3-4.
84.
Henkin unapologetically embraces the political character of international law, ac85.
knowledging that it is the product of "political actors, through political procedures, for
political ends." Id. at 4. He resolves the question of the legitimacy of this system by analogy to
domestic political systems, reasoning that just as domestic legal systems are the products of
domestic societies, international law is the product of the international political system. Id.
Fair enough. But then he proceeds to answer the question of what values the system is designed to promote by grafting the principles of legitimation of domestic legal systems onto the
international legal order. He assumes the values of domestic democracies are the same as
those expressed by the international legal system: "to establish and maintain order and enhance the reliability of expectations; to protect 'persons,' their property and other interests."
Id. However, his argument does not address the question of the values that should guide the
policy choices inherent in protecting these interests, the issue that Robert Post raises. See
supra note 81.
As Benedict Kingsbury observed with regard to the argument that the existing
86.
international legal system is preferable to other options, presumably unrestrained international
politics, less attention is paid to the question of whose interests are served by the present
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its authority from a Security Council-approved statute. The genesis of
the Tribunal contributes to how it is perceived by those in the Balkans.
Research regarding attitudes among Bosnian legal professionals indicates that this important constituency views the Tribunal as the creation7
and imposition of the political will of the international community.1
While some welcomed such intervention-primarily members of national groups victimized in the conflict-members of national groups in
whose name armed forces committed mass atrocities pointed to the political process that created the Tribunal to delegitimize its legal
judgments.88 Although the Tribunal may defend its authority by reference
to its statute, its critics within the countries of the former Yugoslavia
likely will not be quieted completely by a formalist defense. The political distance between the ICC and bystander communities impacted by its
judgments will likely present challenges for the legitimacy of this court
as well. 9
The debate regarding the legitimacy of international justice institutions like the ICTY should not necessarily lead to an uncritical defense
system: "[T]here is no neutral international legal system: its structure, its functioning, and its
conceptions are for the benefit of some groups and interests in preference to others, and what
is needed is an international politics of international law in which these struggles are explicit."
Kingsbury, supra note 14, at 692.
87.
Judges Study, supra note 5; Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operationand Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Items 142-43, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (1999); FirstAnnual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since
1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152, IT 44-49, U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007
(1994) [hereinafter FirstAnnual Report].
88.
Judges Study, supra note 5, at 136-40. Political polarization in the aftermath of
mass violence may make international accountability mechanisms an easy target for attack. A
qualitative study of attitudes toward intercommunity relations carried out in Vukovar, Croatia
and Mostar and Prijedor, Bosnia and Herzegovina over two years found that many felt that
criticism of the Tribunal was the "most socially acceptable option." Participants personalized
international trials of members of their national group and felt "their group" was being adjudicated in the Hague. To support such trials meant rejecting their national group identity or
accepting at least some social or political form of collective responsibility. Thus, criticizing
the Tribunal became the safe alternative. Corkalo et al., Neighbors Again? Intercommunily
Relations After Ethnic Cleansing, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 7, at 148. The
quantitative study in the three cities also found that Croats and Serbs strongly believed that the
Tribunal was biased against them. Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra
note 3, at 193. See also Connecting Justice to Human Experience, supra note 4, at 222-23
(survey data in Rwanda show stronger support for domestic and gacaca trials than for trials
conducted by the ICTR).
89.
Locating accountability mechanisms in the international arena introduces a "foreign" institution, and regardless of whether a tribunal is created by the U.N. Security Council
or a multilateral treaty, these tribunals face enormous challenges to address the priorities of
local communities.
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of posivlsm~ as a means of bolstering the credibility of these tribunals.
We should take note of the ways in which the contested nature of this
inquiry impacts the efficacy of these mechanisms. For example, we may
accept that the norm prohibiting crimes against humanity is the expression of an "ethos of humanity"9 '-a universal condemnation of grave
violations of human dignity. This reaction finds an emotional, moral, and
legal expression in a criminal tribunal adjudicating individuals responsible for such crimes. Thus, while individuals may accept the norm in the
abstract, in the aftermath of violence there will not be consensus about
whether a particular incident is or is not a crime against humanity. Certainly, the armed forces committing atrocities do not accept they are
violating norms but instead commonly deny their actions or defend them
on grounds of self-defense or other justifications. We therefore inevitably confront the challenges to the legality of international institutions
that enforce these norms. Where there are bound to be disagreements
about who should be held accountable for mass suffering, what makes
the court's determination legitimate?
The ICTY has grappled with negative public opinion in the Balkans.
In 1999, the Tribunal's president, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, took initiative to confront concerns regarding how the court was perceived in the
92
region by creating the Outreach Programme. She acted on a report from
the ICTY that many residents in the Balkans viewed the court as politically biased, found its work unrelated to their concerns, and knew very
little of its operations.93 Research conducted at the same time supported
these observations and found that among legal professionals in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, views of the ICTY divided largely along national
lines, with Bosnian Serbs viewing the court most negatively and perceiv94
ing it as irrelevant to processes of social repair. The Tribunal's
diagnosis of the lack of support relied on its assumption that holding95
in the region.
perpetrators accountable would promote reconciliation

Such a defense is consistent with strict legal positivism that holds that states are
90.
bound to uphold the international norms to which they have given explicit consent. For a discussion of the various strands of legal positivism and their relationship to international
criminal law see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW

91.

103-18 (2d ed. 1999).

David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29

YALE

J.

INT'L

L. 85, 90

(2004).
Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
92.
Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 53, IT 14650, U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (1999) [hereinafter Sixth Annual Report].
T 148.
Id.
93.
See Judges Study, supra note 5.
94.
See First Annual Report, supra note 87, 1 11-15 (ICTY will contribute to peace
95.
because "[tihe only civilised alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice: to conduct a
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fair trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to punish those found guilty.");
Second Annual Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
199, U.N. Doc. A/50/365S/1995/728 (1995) ("If the Tribunal can prove to the world that it is possible to administer
international criminal justice, that it is imperative for legal and moral reasons and practical to
do so, it will have performed a great service for the development of international law. It will
also send a message to the victims of appalling crimes that humanity will not turn its back on
them.") [hereinafter Second Annual Report]; Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 50, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665 (1996) ("The Tribunal was established by the Security Council to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and thus, by bringing an end to impunity, to contribute to the restoration of peace and
security.") [hereinafter Third Annual Report]; Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 49, T 4, U.N. Doc. A/52/375-S/1997/729 (1997) (In creating
the Tribunal the UN Security Council was "convinced that its creation would contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace.") [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report]; Fifth Annual
Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 48, T 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/219S/1998/737 (1998) (ICTY mandate is to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law ... with a view that ...their perpetrators be brought to
justice and that peace be restored and maintained.") [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report]; Sixth
Annual Report, supra note 92, 212 ("[Tlhe Tribunal plays an important role in maintaining
international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia, by assisting with the establishment
of civil society, under the rule of law, which is necessary to bring about lasting peace."); Seventh Annual Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 52, 201, U.N. Doc.
A/55/273-S/2000/777 (2000) (The "Tribunal's overall credibility as a mature legal body
whose prosecutorial activities, judicial achievements and moral impact are in line with its
mandate and historic mission.") [hereinafter Seventh Annual Report]; Eighth Annual Report of
the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 61, 280, U.N. Doc. A/56/352-S/2001/865
(2001) (Tribunal reforms "will enable the International Tribunal to make a more effective
contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the Balkans.") [hereinafter Eighth
Annual Report]; Ninth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in
the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR 57th Sess., Agenda Item 45,
327, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (2002) ("The International Tribunal cannot perform
alone the work of justice and memory required for rebuilding a national identity.") [hereinafter
Ninth Annual Report]; Tenth Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecution
of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed
in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 55,
348, U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (2003) ("[T]rials have sent a powerful message that
only through justice can all the peoples of former Yugoslavia achieve reconciliation and create
thriving societies.") [hereinafter Tenth Annual Report]; Eleventh Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since
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Consequently, the Tribunal interpreted the lack of support among resi96
dents primarily as a problem of a lack of information about the court.
Popular support for the work of the Tribunal is necessary to consoli97
date the opportunity for social transformation that trials offer. The
ICTY response was to disseminate information about the Tribunal to
9
domestic audiences, including legal professionals. " Accordingly, the
model for the Outreach Programme expressed Shklar's "ideology of legalism:" the program assumed that citizens would be more supportive of
1991, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 52, [ 320, U.N. Doc. A/59/215-S/2004/627
(2004) (A conference sponsored by the Outreach Programme in the region "highlighted the
need for the Tribunal better to explain at a grass-roots level its method of operations, its decisions and what facts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to promote local
visibility of justice served, prevent revisionism and foster reconciliation.") [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report].
The ICTR adopted a similar model of outreach which primarily aims to inform the
96.
public about how the tribunal functions as a legal institution of individual accountability. The
outreach program for the Rwandan tribunal is first mentioned in its sixth annual report and its
activities are described as disseminating information about the Tribunal's proceedings through
radio programming, an information center in Kigali, and training for Rwandan judges. Sixth
Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January
142-47, U.N. Doc.
and 31 December 1991, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 62,
A156/351-S/2001/863 (2001). The outreach program for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
appears to aim for deeper engagement with the public than the ad hoc tribunals. The program
began as a part of the Office of the Prosecutor but in 2003 became an independent office with
a mission to "foster[] an environment of two-way communication between Sierra Leoneans
and the Special Court, which it has implemented through town hall meetings with various
sectors, including the army." First Annual Report of the Presidentof the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: for the Period 2 December 2002-1 December 2003, 26, at http://www.scsl.org/specialcourtannualreport2002-2003.pdf; see also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
EFFECTIVE PUBLIC OUTREACH FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Jan. 2004), at

http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemational-justice/icc/outreach -brieLpaper - 0 11404.pdf
(noting that the Special Court sought to avoid the mistakes of the ad hoc tribunals and made
"public outreach a priority"); see discussion infra Part IV.B.3(a).
Former ICTY President Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald expressed the importance
97.
of outreach to the success of the Tribunal: "If judgments issued hundreds of miles from the
scene of the conflict by an international court are to have an effect on the community, that
community must understand and appreciate the work of the Tribunal." Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The 2000 Goodwin Seminar Article & Essay: The International Criminal Tribunals: Crime and Punishment in the InternationalArena, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 667, 684
(2001).
Sixth Annual Report, supra note 92, 150 ("The Tribunal is now establishing a
98.
program dedicated to explaining its work and addressing the effects of misperceptions and
misinformation'"). For the next two years, the program reported that its primary activities were
to provide copies of key documents and judgments of the court in the local languages, as well
as to develop a website targeted to local audiences with broadcasts of court sessions. Seventh
214-15. In 2002, the Court reported that a group of ICTY
Annual Report, supra note 95,
judges traveled to the region and met with "prominent political and judicial figures" to "improve [the ICTY judges'] knowledge of the national legal systems and to indicate their support
for the Tribunal's Outreach Programme.") Ninth Annual Report, supra note 95, 46.
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the court if they understood how the court worked as an adjudicative
body. Education about the structure and operation of the court might respond to criticism that the Tribunal was a political rather than legal
institution. But this type of outreach does not directly answer concerns
that the Tribunal is irrelevant to the rebuilding of communities. The Tribunal's response did not counter the defensive rejection among
bystanders of trials of "their" national group. Individual accountability
does not automatically lead to rejection of perpetrators by bystanders.
The challenges that trials may pose for social reconstruction should
not cause us to abandon accountability as a partial response to mass violence but instead should make us attentive to the need for tribunals
applying international criminal law to act in ways that contribute to the
social and political acceptance of these accountability mechanisms
within bystander communities. The next section lays the foundation for
exploring proposals to do so by reviewing an international crime that
implicates bystanders: crimes against humanity.
D. The Crime Against Humanity as a Frameworkfor
Adjudicatingthe Role of the Bystanders

Crimes against humanity, as the name implies, purport to reflect universal norms sanctioning severe forms of abuse. While the concept
predated World War II, allied drafters of the Nuremberg Charter included
crimes of humanity as a substantive offense in the document and Nazi
leaders were the first ever to stand trial for this offense. 99 As legal philosopher David Luban writes, crimes against humanity reflect two
distinct normative claims.
First, the phrase "crimes against humanity" suggests offenses that
aggrieve not only the victims and their own communities but all human
beings, regardless of their community. Second, the phrase suggests that
these offenses cut deep, violating the core humanity that we all share and
that distinguishes us from other natural beings.'°°
99.

Crimes against humanity were first codified in Article (c) of the Nuremberg Charter

as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country were perpetrated.
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 90.
100.
Luban, supra note 91, at 86. "[T]he acts constituting crimes against humanity will
generally be those characterized by the directness and gravity of their assault upon the human
person, both corporeal and spiritual." STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNT-
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In addition to the universal value enshrined in the norm, the legal
elements of the crime-notably the requirement that the violations be of
a widespread or systematic nature-infuse a collective dimension to the
offense which makes it suitable for an examination of the potential for
trials to address bystanders.' ° '
As the case study in the next section is drawn from the ICTY, the
definition of crimes against humanity provided in that statute serves as
the basis for this discussion. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute defines crimes
against humanity and establishes that the Tribunal will have the power to
prosecute:
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character,
and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts. '02
The general requirements, or chapeau elements, of the crime are:
(1) an "attack" (2) which is linked to the acts of the accused, (3) directed
ABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 69 (2001).

Genocide, defined as the commission of particular act(s) "with intent to destroy, in
101.
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such," is also an international crime that addresses collective violence. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The offense has been referred to as "the crime of crimes." Diane Marie Amann, Identification, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

483 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2005). However its

legal requirements render it less favorable to engage bystanders regarding their relationship to
the violence than crimes against humanity. To convict an accused of genocide, the acts must
be capable of destroying a collective in whole or in part, while destruction of a group is not
required for acts to constitute crimes against humanity. Thus, for purposes of exploring the
relationship of bystanders to mass violence, crimes against humanity encompasses more types
of criminal behavior and, coupled with the wide or systematic element, presents relatively
greater opportunities for international judges to address the role of bystanders.
ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.
102.
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against a civilian population, (4) widespread or systematic, (5) and
which the accused committed with the requisite intent.' 3 In addition to
satisfying the general requirements, the acts must fit into one of the specific crimes listed in article 5(a-i).i
Thus, crimes against humanity implicate collectives in ways that are
important for bystanders. The general requirements demand that the acts
be directed toward a civilianpopulation. For this offense, a population is
defined by common social or other characteristics that render it a target.' 5 Further, the criminal behavior must be part of a "widespread or
systematic" attack. Widespread connotes the scale of the crime and may
mean a perpetrator acted against a large number of victims in a single
incident, or the attack was widespread because of the cumulative effects
of a number of incidents.' ° The systematic nature of the attack refers to
an attack that occurs as part of an organized plan to commit violence on
a collective. As one international lawyer has commented, the "widespread" and "systematic" aspects of crimes against humanity overlap: "A
widespread attack targeting a large number of victims generally reflects
patterns of similar abuses and often relies on some form of planning or
organization. A systematic attack frequently has the potential, purpose,
or effect of reaching many people."'0 7
This element therefore captures the descriptive similarity and violent
distinctions between perpetrators, bystanders, and victims. Bystanders
103.
For a fuller discussion of the elements of crimes against humanity of the ad hoc
tribunals and their development, see METTRAUX, supra note 72.
104.
There is a rich literature on international crimes and crimes against humanity that
will not be plumbed here. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 90; GEOFFREY ROBERTSON Q.C., CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999) (A comprehensive
survey
of the development of crimes against humanity); Luban, supra note 91 (explaining that crimes
against humanity represent an affront to humans as political animals who need to live in
groups); James Bohman, Punishmentas a Political Obligation: Crimes Against Humanity and
the Enforceable Right to Membership, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 551 (2002) (describing how
enforcing crimes against humanity establishes the political basis for citizens to influence political terms of cooperation and redress wrongs); Darryl Robinson, Developments in
International Criminal Law: Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference,
93 AM. J.INT'L L. 43 (1999) (arguing that the policy element be added to the definition of
crime against humanity in Article 7 of the ICC Statute); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of
Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787
(1999) (tracing the evolution of crimes against humanity with particular focus on the war
nexus requirement).
105.
Prosecutor v.Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Judgment, 423; see also METTRAUX,
supra note 72, at 166. A small group that is attacked may be considered a "population" if the
particular incident is related to the widespread or systematic nature of the overall attack. For
example, where the inmates of a detention center are targeted for abuse as part of a larger
campaign, they may be considered a "population." See Prosecutor v. Kunarac.
106.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, 206; see METTRAUX, supra
note 72, at 171.
107.
METTRAUX, supra note 72, at 171 (citations omitted).
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and victims are both "innocent" civilians legally protected from abuse
and but for the criminal attack would be-juridically speaking-part of a
collective. An attack by perpetrators cleaves this collective into bystanders and victims.' 8 Attacks of perpetrators, widespread or systematic, are
of a severe nature against a targeted collective. Wrongdoers select their
victims based on shared characteristics rather than on any unique attributes; conversely, perpetrators spare bystanders because they do not share
the characteristic that marks victims. Particularly when the substantive
offense is persecution, crimes against humanity legally instantiate the
division of the community along the ethnic, political, or national group
lines defined by the perpetrators' criminal motives.'°9
Of relevance to this discussion is the definition of the substantive
crime of persecution as a crime against humanity. The ICTY has defined
persecution as "the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of
a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law,
reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in article
Thus, persecution may consist of crimes listed in article 5 (murder,
5.""o0
torture, rape, etc.), or may include unlawful arrest and detention, interrogations, beatings, and forced labor."' These persecution-type crimes
include a discriminatory intent element; prosecutors have to prove that
perpetrators target their victims based on their group membershippolitical, racial, or religious in the case of the former Yugoslavia. One
ICTY Trial Chamber has held that the persecution mens rea requirement
constitutes a heightened standard, "which consists of removing individuThe distinction between bystanders and victims may have greater relevance for
108.
social reconstruction depending on the local conditions of the attack. For example bystanders
and victims may not necessarily reside in the same community for purposes of a legal analysis. Where an entire village is targeted, all residents may be considered victims. Nevertheless,
within the larger collective-a region or nation-the differentiation may hold true and thus
efforts at social reconstruction should be directed toward engaging bystanders, even where the
bystanders did not live in a targeted community. And perhaps under these conditions such
engagement will be more important since residents may have fewer ties to the victim group,
yet their ability to empathize with those who suffered will be critical to their support for new
social arrangements to promote tolerance and respect for human rights. See generally Jodi
Halpern & Harvey M. Weinstein, Empathy & Rehumanization After Mass Violence, in My
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY supra note 3, 303, at 303-22.
The legal distinction between targeted groups and those who were "safe" may dis109.
tort the reality. In an ethnically integrated community, attacks singling out a particular ethnic
group may affect entire families formed through mixed marriages. Similarly, a member of the
same ethnic group as the perpetrators may be singled out for attack where that person is suspected of protecting the targeted group. METTRAUX, supra note 72, at 167.
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment, 621. Persecutory
110.
acts may take many forms and include not only physical deprivations, but economic or judicial
deprivations that violate an individual's fundamental human rights. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case
No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, 710 (May 7, 1997).
Simi6, supra note 8, 48.
111.
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als from the society in which they
2 live alongside the perpetrators, or
eventually from humanity itself.""
Crimes against humanity represent some of the worst aspects of social breakdown. Bystanders live through and are affected by the
disintegration of communal ties that generates crimes against humanity
and yet are not a subject of the law's response to the horrors. The question is whether international tribunals can support or initiate a process
through which bystanders confront and acknowledge their role in the
atrocities that were committed in their name. " '
The following Part analyzes Prosecutor v. Simi6 et al., a case from

the ICTY, to explore how the law may help and hurt this process of acknowledgment. Prosecutorv. Simi6 et al., the prosecution of one of the
highest ranking civilian leaders for crimes against humanity, is selected
for scrutiny for several reasons. First, trials of civilians rather than military and paramilitary personnel appear to offer a better vehicle to
measure the law's ability to further the aims of social reconstruction
among bystanders. Combatants have taken up arms and are prepared to
engage in violence. Formal control over armed fighters lies outside civil
lines of authority. Military operations are not necessarily witnessed by
civilians. Thus, the social and political distance between civilians and
combatants renders it easier for bystanders to distinguish "them" from
"us." In theory, the more direct association between civilian leaders
and
the civilian population offers the possibility that bystanders may draw
more direct analogies from these defendants to their own behavior and
relationship to the violence."14 Second, and similarly, criminal charges of
crimes against humanity-that include elements that implicate evidence
of violence beyond the acts of the accused-may present bystanders
with a glimpse of themselves through the rubric of international criminal
law.
This Article focuses on a single judgment from the ICTY Certainly,
the judgment and its factual discussion are specific to the defendants and
events in a particular area of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the nature of
112.
Gudnadl Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J.
237, 295 (citing Prosecutor v. Kordik, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgment, IT 211-20).
113.
Ironically, Antonio Cassese, the former president of the ICTY, noted that one of the
disadvantages of international criminal trials was that they are often protracted because elements of the crime, like crimes against humanity, require that courts consider "the historical or

social context of the crime."

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

270 (2001).

114.
Empirical research is needed to further differentiate the reactions of bystanderssilent and complicit-to trials. One challenge for conducting this work would be to design a
study that would minimize possible selection bias (participation of those who identify as silent
rather than complicit bystanders) and the possibility that informants who supported forces that
committed atrocities would not be candid in their views.
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the conflict in the Balkans may limit the application of conclusions
drawn from this case to other conflicts, in which perpetrators attack entire communities and there are no meaningful divisions between
bystanders and victims. The Trial Chamber's treatment of bystanders is
not necessarily representative of the jurisprudence of the ICTY However, because international criminal law does not sanction bystanders,
the ability of judgments to address their role is circumscribed in ways
that are unlikely, in the aggregate, to generate substantial variation in
how the case law treats this group. The analysis of this case, selected for
its potential relevance to bystanders, alerts us to some of the limits of the
application of international criminal law to promote social reconstruction
to which international justice institutions-as well as other institutions
involved in social reconstruction-need to attend.

III.

THE SIMIC CASE

A. Simi6 's Serb Crisis Staff Takes Over in Bosanski Samac
The events in Bosanski Samac, Bosnia and Herzegovina, depict in
many important ways the unfolding of the 1992-1995 war in that country. Bosnian Serb armed forces, supported by paramilitary groups,
conducted violent cleansing operations to implement the political goals
of Bosnian Serb leaders to create a Greater Serbia populated by ethnic
Serbs. At the end of 1994, Serb forces controlled 70% of the territory of
the Bosnian Republic." 5 Through the negotiations at the end of the war,
the Bosnian Serbs received 49% of the territory." 6 Carrying out its mandate to prosecute individuals responsible for "serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former
Yugoslavia,"" 7 the ICTY Prosecutor primarily has convicted ethnic Serb
defendants of crimes against humanity and genocide."'
The Simi6 case concerns the takeover of and subsequent events in
and around the municipality of Bosanski Samac, in northeastern Bosnia
and Herzegovina." 9 The town lies on the banks of the Bosna and Sava
115.

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN

RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR

116.

U.S.

1994 (1995).

DEP'T OF STATE, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN

1996 (1997).
ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 2.
117.
118.
Based on a review of Tribunal Annual Reports, supra notes 87, 92, and 95, and case
reports on the website of the Tribunal, http://www.icty.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2005), the
Prosecutor has secured convictions for crimes against humanity against 56 individuals, of
which 44 are ethnic Serbs (from either Bosnia or Serbia) and 12 are ethnic Croats (from Bosnia or Croatia).
119.
Simi6, supra note 8, 178.
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
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Rivers, on the border with Croatia, and is an important transport center
for goods between the two republics.' 20 Before the conflict, those identifying as Serbs (41.3%) and Croats (44.7%) comprised the two major
national groups in the municipality, with a small number identifying as
Muslim (6.8%) and Other (7.2%).2 The area was also one of strategic
importance, as it was part of the "Posavina Corridor"-a narrow strip of
land that connected the Serb-controlled areas within Croatia to those controlled by Bosnian Serb forces in the east and the Republic of Serbia.'
The social breakdown in Bosanski amac mirrored on a smaller
scale the political and social disintegration throughout the country. National elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 saw the three
dominant political parties, organized around national group identity,
winning most of the seats: the Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ) representing Croats, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) promoting Serb
interests; and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) associated with
Bosnian Muslims.' 23 The SDS established a separate national assembly
to represent Serb interests, and worked to organize separate political, and
eventually military, institutions to advocate for Bosnian Serbs.'24 The
SDS boycotted a government referendum on independence held on February 29, 1992.15 The Bosnian government ratified the affirmative vote
by declaring independence on March 3, 1992.26 Fighting broke out in
Sarajevo on2 7the heels of international recognition of the new state in
early April.
The Trial Chamber described a similar centripetal momentum toward political polarization in Bosanski Samac that led inexorably to the
takeover of the town.' 8 At the local level, the three national parties won a
plurality of seats in the municipal assembly in the 1990 elections.' 29 Prior
to the takeover, Bosnian Serb leaders had established political institu120.
Id. 174
121.
Id. 175
122.
Id.
123.
Id. 166.
124.
Id. %1 168-72. The opinion traces the devolution of national unity through a referendum organized by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) asking Serbs whether they wanted
an independent Bosnian state. The Bosnian Serb participants voted against the referendum.
Based on the voting results, the SDS established a self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" which later became Republika Srpska.
125.
Id. 171.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. The European Community formally recognized Bosnian independence on April
6, 1992, followed the next day by recognition from the United States.
128.
The court explicitly inscribes events in the municipality as a recapitulation of the
national drama: "The political situation in Bosanski amac in the period of 1990 to 1992 was
a reflection, at the local level, of the general political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Id.
176.
129.
Id.
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tions "for the purpose of assuming power and consolidating Serb authority" in Bosanski amac.3 The local SDS initiative led to the
establishment of a parallel civil administration for Bosnian Serbs in the
area."' The regional body was directed by Blagoje Simi6, a 32-year old
physician and president of the local SDS. Simi6 formed the "Serb Crisis
Staff ' 132 that assumed political control of the area after the takeover.'33
Simi6 served in this capacity after the end of the conflict. UN police
stationed in the area were well aware that Simi6 remained in charge. In
an interview with a foreign journalist in November 1996 from his town
hall office, Simi6 remarked that he was "not uncatchable" and attributed
his freedom to the fact that President Bill Clinton had not yet ordered
him arrested. 34 Later Simid went to Serbia and, although born a Bosnian
Serb, acquired Yugoslav citizenship. On March 12, 2001, Simi6 was the
first Yugoslav citizen indicted by the ICTY to voluntarily surrender to
the Tribunal.'35 His surrender came on the heels of increased pressure on
the recently elected Serb prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, to cooperate
with the ICTY. 36 Simi6 faced trial
with two co-defendants, his subordi37
authority.
civil
the
within
nates
Social breakdown among national groups in the area began in
earnest in the fall of 1991.38 The level and frequency of the violent
events (which the Trial Chamber describes as "tensions") increased and
included sabotage of public and private property, bombings, and
shootings. 3 9 Defense witnesses explained that "a gradual separation and
130.
Id. 379.
131.
Id. 177.
132.
This body was later renamed "War Presidency of the Serbian Municipality of
Bosanski Samac."
133.
Id. 1385.
134.
Elizabeth Neuffer, Indicted Serb Town Official 'Not Uncatchable,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 1, 1996, at Al.
135.
Vesna Peric Zimonjic & Stephen Castle, Mayor Accused of Bosnian War Crimes
Surrenders to Hague Tribunal, THE INDEP., Mar. 13, 2001, at 12.
136.
Steven Erlanger, Bosnian Serb Surrenders to Hague Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2001, at A8. Serb officials denied they had intervened in the matter. Id. However, the Serbian
government had to meet a March 31st deadline for certification by the United States that it
was cooperating with the ICTY in order to prevent a cut-off of U.S. financial assistance. Id.
137.
The Tribunal indicted Simid, with five others, for events that occurred in the municipality. At the time of his surrender, his co-defendants already were in The Hague (one
defendant, Slobodan Miljokvic, had been killed in Serbia). Law of War & Victims, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REI'. (May 2001). Three co-defendants-Milan Simi, Miroslav Tadi6, and
Simo Zaria-had surrendered to the Tribunal in February 1998. INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 213 (2001), at http://www.iwpr.netlindex.pl?archive/tri
tri-213-4_eng.txt. A fourth, the police chief, Stevan Todorovi6, had already pled guilty in
December 2000 for his role in the ethnic cleansing operations, and was awaiting sentencing.
Zimonjic & Castle, supra note 135.
138.
Simie, supra note 8, V 182-83.
139.
Id. 183.
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segregation started to set in where, for example, Muslims and Croats
would each group together according to ethnic or national affiliations in
cafes, schools, enterprises, sporting events and each group increasingly
supported its own national party.' 40 Against this backdrop of the
entrenchment of social and political life along national lines, the court
traces the organization of armed forces that cast Croats and Muslims on
one side'4 ' against Serbs on the other. The national military-the
Yugoslav Peoples' Army-under the control of the President of rump
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milo'evic, prepared to defend Bosanski amac by
organizing local military forces into a group known as the 4th
Detachment.'4 2 The purpose of the unit, comprised predominantly-but
not exclusively-of Serbs, was to defend the area against attack should
the war in neighboring Croatia spill over the border.' 43 Paramilitary
forces from Serbia entered the area days before the takeover, joined with
Serb police on the morning of April 17, and through force asserted
control of the city.'"
The attack by Serb paramilitaries began in the early hours of April
17.' 5 Guided by members of local Bosnian Serb defense forces, paramilitaries easily seized control of key buildings including the post office,
police station, and radio station.' 46 The day of the takeover, Simi6 was
appointed President of the Crisis Staff and became the highest-ranking
civilian in the municipality.4 1 Within a few days .the Serb forces established control over most of the area.148
Within a month of the takeover, the Crisis Staff issued a series of orders restricting the rights of civilians. The civilian authority banned all
political parties and activities,'4 9 imposed a curfew,'50 required that civilians obtain a permit to enter or leave Bosanski Samac, and enforced this

140.
Id. 190.
141.
Beginning in 1992, armed groups organized along national groups became visible
with the municipality. National soldiers, the remnants of the Yugoslavian army (JNA) primarily Serbs, patrolled areas inhabited by Serbs, while Croat and Bosnian Muslim residents
formed separate defense units. Id. H 243-46. Following international recognition of an independent state, the municipal assembly-with the participation of all three national partiesformed a local Territorial Defense (TO) to protect the town. Id. 1260-65.
142.
Id. 194, 201.
143.
Id. 203. In fact, in the days leading up to the takeover, Bosnian Serb authorities
believed that an attack from Croatia was imminent. Id. 444.
144.
Id. [442-43.
145.
Id. [ 398-99
146.
Id. 442.
147.
Id. I 386, 390.
148.
Id. 455.
149.
Id. IT 465, 507.
150.
Id. 471.
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the
system at checkpoints established throughout the area.5 ' In addition,
52
fuel.
of
use
and
alcohol
of
consumption
the
restricted
Staff
Crisis
The Trial Chamber judges acknowledged that life during the war became harder for Serbs and non-Serbs in Bosanski amac; shelling of the
town damaged infrastructure, and basic necessities like water and electricity were in short supply.'53 But if life for bystanders was difficult, life
for scores of non-Serbs became a living hell. Serb members of the local
police and Serb paramilitaries conducted large scale arrests of hundreds
of non-Serbs after the takeover and continuing through December
1992.11 In response to the escape of non-Serb men from the area, Serb
police and military went house to house in late June and arrested the
families of those who had fled.'5 5 Women, children and the elderly were
forced onto
military trucks and taken to the neighboring town of
56
Crkvina1
Those arrested were held in various municipal buildings that were
converted to detention facilities. Detainees were held in the municipal
police station (Secretariat of the Interior, or SUP), the Territorial Defense57
building headquarters (TO), as well as elementary and high schools.'
Non-Serb victims testified-for the prosecution and for defendantsthey did not know the reason for their arrest.'5 8 The length of detention
varied. Some were held for a day and released, although authorities required them to report to SUP multiple times a day.5 9 Others fared much
worse. Paramilitary guards stripped prisoners of their personal possessions and valuables' 60 and threatened relatives of those detained that they
would kill their loved ones if the family did not pay the guards large

151.
Id. IT 474-75.
152.
Id. 1 512. The prosecution offered evidence of orders to hold Croats in "vital facilities" in the town and villages and mandates that Muslims and Croats wear white armbands. Id.
In 461, 478. Witnesses also testified that phone lines to non-Serbs had been cut. Id. 487.
Despite this evidence, the Trial Chamber judges found that most of the restrictions applied
equally to Bosnian Serb and non-Serb civilians. They found the evidence inconclusive regarding some of the more egregious allegations, including that the Crisis Staff ordered civilians of
Croatian nationality to be "isolated and taken to vital facilities." Id. IN 461, 505. The Trial
Chamber determined that the Crisis Staff violated the rights of non-Serbs to their heritage and
discriminated against them by declaring the date of the takeover a holiday and changing the
symbols of the town and street names, but found that none of these order were sufficiently
serious to constitute persecution. Id. T 516.
153.
ld. T 513.
154.
Id. ( 654-55.

155.

Id. T 656.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. T 661.
Id. T 526.
Id. 535.
Id. T 847.
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sums of money. 6 Authorities kept prisoners in overcrowded conditions
and deprived them of food, water, and medical attention. 62 Guards tormented prisoners verbally by forcing detainees to sing "Chetnik" songs,
and Serb jailors called prisoners
"ustasha" or "balija"-derogatory terms
63
Muslims.1
and
for Croats
Members of Serb paramilitary groups and local police frequently
beat detainees with a variety of crude instruments including metal bars,
baseball bats, metal chains, and chair legs.' 6 One victim testified that a
guard directed three other guards to beat him, each taking turns striking
his head. The opinion described his testimony: "He fell down and tried
to protect his head. As he crouched down, he received a blow to his spine
from the kick of an army boot. This caused his hands to open up from
covering his face, and he was then kicked in the face.', 165 As he lay prostrate from the blows, the guard directing the attack jumped on his left
hand and broke some of his fingers.'66
The Crisis Staff established a forced labor system in the aftermath of
the takeover. Non-Serbs who managed to avoid arrest or detention were
not exempt from deprivation. Several prominent non-Serbs received
work assignments designed to publicly humiliate them. 67 For example,
the non-Serb former chief of police was taken prisoner and forced in detention "to clean a room in front of two detained Bosnian women."' 68 The
former heads of large commercial institutions were forced publicly to
perform menial labor at the sites of the establishments they formerly directed. 69 Private industry benefited from forced labor, though not all
businesses accepted such assistance. A representative of a refinery outside the area turned down an offer of forced laborers from defendant
Zari6 with a reprimand to the Bosnian Serb official that he "should be

161.
Id. 1848.
162.
Id. [774.
163.
Id. ]773.
164.
Id. [770.
165.
Id. 704.
166.
Id.
167.
Shortly after the takeover, the Crisis Staff instituted a forced labor program that
continued into the fall of 1992. Id. 778. Civil authorities assigned male and female civilians
to perform a variety of tasks from harvesting crops, chopping wood, and other agricultural
assignments, to repairing and maintaining the public water and power supplies. Id. In 785-86.
Non-Serbs were forced to work on the front lines, digging trenches and providing logistical
support. Id. IN 779-84.
168.
Id. 1790.
169.
The former managing director of the local office of Jugobank and a director of the
textile factory-both Bosniaks-were forced to sweep the streets around the bank and the
ground of the factory, respectively. Id. 790.
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'careful of what he was doing so that he would not be ashamed of him70
self later.'"
Testimony from witnesses evoked scenes of Bosnian Serb civilians,
military, and civil officials looting and plundering from non-Serbs willynilly. Victims testified that they were evicted from their homes and all
their personal property-cars, appliances, jewelry-was taken. "' Authorities rounded up and arrested a group of Croat women and children
from the town market.' Prosecution witnesses described how authorities
ordered them to loot the homes of Croats and Muslims.'73 Witnesses testified that non-Serb business owners had their businesses stripped from
them and given to new Serb owners. 7 4 Paramilitaries, members of the
Bosnian Serb defense forces, police, and Serb civilians plundered nonSerb property, carting off furniture, appliances, farm equipment, and
commercial goods. 175 Some looting was organized through civilian authorities, and victims worked alongside Serb soldiers and private citizens
Serb army trucks and trucks bearing logos of
to load goods onto Bosnian
76
businesses.
state-owned
Authorities in Bosanski amac organized "exchanges" of non-Serb
civilians and detainees held in the municipality to Croatia and other parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A dozen exchanges occurred between July
1992 and December 1993. 7 The non-Serbs who left the area as a result
of this process included prisoners and civilians who were not detained
but subjected to forced labor and other restrictions. 7 1 Victims testified
that they did not want to leave their homes, but felt that they had no7
1
choice. Ibrahim Salki6, held at a detention center in Bosanski amac,1
explained that being exchanged was not "voluntary"-it was his only
hope to save his life: "[I]t would not be fitting to ask somebody whether
they wanted [to be exchanged] or not. It was the only way to save my
head."'8 0 Hundreds of non-Serbs were deported or forcibly transferred in
this manner. 8 '

170.
171.
172.
173.
the home
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. 828.
Id. 843.
Id. 556.
Id. 791. Witnesses described their feeling of humiliation at being forced to loot
of former mentors and neighbors. Id. 791-92.
Id.$ 846.
Id. [[ 873, 874.
Id. 851.
Id. [878-900.
Id.AJ 887-91.
Id. 552.
Id. 888.
Id. [980.
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B. Judgment Convicting Simi6

Simi6 and his co-defendants, Miroslav Tadi6 (responsible for prisoner exchanges) and Simo Zarid (in charge of security and a local
commander in the Bosnian Serb army), were charged with crimes
against humanity for persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
against non-Serb civilians. Specifically, the indictment charged defendants with crimes against humanity for the forcible takeover of cities;
unlawful arrest and detention of civilians; cruel and inhumane treatment
including beatings and torture; forced labor; deportation and forcible
transfer; and plundering and looting in the Municipality of Bosanski
amac, neighboring Odlak, and elsewhere. 2 The indictment additionally charged Simi6, as the highest-ranking civilian authority, with
committing crimes against humanity by issuing orders that violated fundamental rights of non-Serb civilians.'83
The Trial Chamber found that the general requirements of crimes
against humanity had been met. The Trial Chamber found that the civilian population of Bosanki Samac was under attack from the April 17
takeover through December 31, 1993.' 4 The attack occurred during a
state of armed conflict within the country and there was the requisite
relationship between the armed conflict and the acts of defendants. 85 The
attack was both widespread and systematic, and followed with persecution of non-Serbs.1 6 Further, the court held that the defendants were
aware of and their actions were part of the armed attack against nonSerbs. 187
Turning to the individual defendants and the specific charges against
them, the Trial Chamber found that Simi6 was a participant along with
members of the Serb police, paramilitaries, and the JNA contingent in a
"basic form" of joint criminal enterprise to persecute non-Serbs in
Bosanski Samac municipality. 8 8 The judges found sufficient evidence
that Blagoje Simi6 was "at the apex" of the joint criminal enterprise in
the municipality. The Trial Chamber singled out Simid for approbation
as the highest civilian authority who used his power to discriminate
against non-Serbs living in his jurisdiction.'8 9 In addition, the Trial
182.
Id. 8.
183.
Id. 9.
184.
Id. 1978.
185.
Id.
186.
Id. [979.
187.
Id. U 981-82.
188.
Id. 983-84. The court only considered the "basic" joint criminal enterprise theory,
finding that the prosecution did not plead sufficiently detailed facts to put defendants on notice
of any other theory of joint criminal liability.
189.
Id. 992.
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Chamber found Simi6 individually criminally responsible as a member
of the enterprise for the crimes against humanity that were carried out
through persecutory acts against non-Serbs, specifically their unlawful
arrest and detention; 9"° cruel and inhumane treatment in detention facili92 and deportation and forcible
ties; ' forced labor assignments;
9 The Trial Chamber sentenced him to seventeen years. 94 Simi6
transfer.'
has appealed the judgment, which is pending.
Simi's co-defendants played lesser roles in the administration of the
persecutory plan and the Trial Chamber found them liable as aiders and
abettors for a narrower number of the specific types of persecution utilized by the common plan. Judges convicted Mirolsav Tadi6 of crimes
against humanity for persecution in his role in organizing the deportation
and forcible transfers of non-Serbs from the area and sentenced him to
eight years. 95 Judges convicted Simo Zari6, a commander in the local
Bosnian Serb armed forces responsible for intelligence, of persecution as
a crime against humanity based on cruel and inhumane treatment of nonSerb prisoners in detention facilities 96 and imposed a six-year sentence.' 97
C. Separate and PartlyDissenting Opinion
of Judge Per-JohanLindholm
Judge Per-Johan Lindholm issued a separate opinion in which he
dissents in part. His views are relevant to the case analysis in two ways.
First, he offered an ambiguous reference to the role of bystanders. Second, his interpretation of the varying levels of responsibility of Simi6's
co-defendants is a good example of the type of individual differentiation
among defendants that courts are able to provide, but which accountability and other mechanisms of social reconstruction are unable to issue to
individual bystanders.
Lindholm agreed with the majority that the defendants "acted in con9
cert together" to further a plan to takeover the town. ' However, Lindholm
disagreed that defendants carried out this plan with persecutory intent
190.

Id. [997.

191.

Id. 1010.

Id. 1 1022.
192.
Id. 1 1038. The court dismissed some charges, finding that forcible takeover was
193.
not, standing alone, a crime against humanity. Id. 456. The judges also found insufficient
evidence of criminal intent to find Simi6 or his co-accused liable for plunder. Id. 1027.
Id.[ 1118.
194.
Id.(H 1119-22.
195.
Id. 1123.
196.
Id. 1126.
197.
Prosecutor v. Simid et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, Separate Opinion of
198.
Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, M 4, 7 (Oct. 17, 2003)[hereinafter Separate Simi6 Opinion].
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against non-Serbs. He cited the evidence of increasing tension among the
primary national groups in the area beginning in the fall of 1991, which
escalated with the mobilization of Croatian forces across the river and
Bosniak forces within the town.' 99 Lindholm viewed Serbs in the area as
having had a reasonable fear of attack from forces in Croatia that justified the launch of a preemptive strike to "avoid[] ... inter-ethnic
bloodshed or even bloodbath."2°° Persecution against non-Serbs did occur, but Lindholm found this was not a result of defendants' plan; rather
it was the result of events going "out of control due to the activities of a
number of criminals who opened the sluice-gate to evil, which thereafter
was willingly accepted and used by maliciously and easily-led people."' '
Turning to the individual defendants, Lindholm found that Simid
was aware of but did not participate in the persecutory acts committed
against non-Serbs-unlawful arrests and detention, cruel and inhumane
treatment, forced labor, and deportation and forcible transfer. The judge
found that with the exception of deportation and forcible transfer, Simi6
did not share the criminal intent of the perpetrators to commit these
acts. 2° Lindholm found the defendant criminally liable for these acts because he failed his duty "as the highest-ranking civilian official" in the
area to protect the non-Serbs living in his jurisdiction. 3 Lindholm disagreed with the seventeen-year sentence imposed by the majority,
finding instead that principles of proportionality militated in favor of a
lesser sentence. The judge pointed out that a former co-defendant, Stevan Todorovi6, the Chief of Police of the municipality during the events,
was perhaps "the main architect of the terror regime," pled guilty for his
role, and only received a ten-year sentence. 2 4 Accordingly, Lindholm
recommended a seven-year sentence for Simi6.
With regard to Miroslav Tadi6, Lindholm agreed with the majority in
deciding to convict the defendant due to his substantial contribution to
the deportation of non-Serbs. 20 5 However, Lindholm found that the defendant carried out the deportations in a situation of duress2 ---his
199.
Id. 8.
200.
Id. 9.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. 11. With regard to deportation and forced transfer, Lindholm found that the
Bosnian Serb leader shared the persecutory intent of those who carried out these acts, and his

failure to prevent these acts made him guilty as a co-perpetrator of deportations as a crime
against humanity. Id. 12
203.
Id. 10.
204.
Id. 39 (emphasis in original). Todorovid pleaded guilty to persecutions including
beatings and murder, sexual assaults, ordering of torture, interrogation and forced confessions
of detained persons, and deportations. Id.
205.
Id. W 14-16.
206.
Id. (M 17-20.
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transfer of non-Serbs out of town saved these victims from worse treatment in detention centers 2 7-and therefore Lindholm reasoned that
Tadi6 was not guilty. As for Simo Zarid, Lindholm joined with the majority in convicting the defendant as an aider and abettor of the joint
criminal enterprise of persecution as a crime against humanity for his
role in mistreatment of detainees. 28 However, the judge disagreed with
the majority's finding that Zari4's acts had a substantial effect on the
persecutions, citing ZariCs subordinate position of status and authority
to portray him as being unable to influence the conduct of police chief
2°9
Todorovi6 and his "paramilitary henchmen." Therefore, Lindholm
found the prosecution had not met its burden of proof and found Zari6
not guilty of article 7(1) of the Statute.2 °
Lindholm's separate opinion places Simid's subordinates in the context of the many perpetrators-some who had been convicted by the
ICTY and others unnamed and unindicted-who committed persecutory
acts against non-Serbs in the region. Lindholm depicts the two codefendants as conflicted (Zari6 was aware of the prisoner beatings and
complained to the Chief of Police), if not sympathetic (Tadir's leadership in prisoner exchanges served humanitarian aims). His close parsing
of contribution and responsibility of these subordinates is an example of
law as a powerful tool to calibrate individual responsibility for war
crimes. The question is whether nonaccountability mechanisms can be
created that will enable bystanders to confront and acknowledge their
own roles in crimes committed in their communities with similar subtlety.
IV. REFORMING THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS IN
ADJUDICATION OF ATROCITIES

The Trial Chamber at the time identified the Simi6 case as unique
among prosecutions before the ICTY and ICTR. Simi6 required the
judges to consider the criminal responsibility of a civilian leader who did
not directly engage in the crimes but who was integrally involved and in1
vested in maintaining control of the town and its non-Serb residents.
Discussion of criminal responsibility for this category of defendant would
seem relevant to an examination of how court opinions do and could address the related category of bystanders to crimes against humanity. The
207.

Id. 9N 21-28.

208.

Id. U 29-30.

209.
210.
211.

Id. H] 32-34.
Id. [35.
Simi6, supra note 8,
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opinion is useful for exploring the ways in which bystanders figure in
the Trial Chamber's adjudication in order to evaluate the claim advanced
here that mechanisms for social reconstruction should engage bystanders
in ways that motivate them to acknowledge their relationship to the violence. Individual attribution of criminal liability by international criminal
justice mechanisms assists and challenges this process.
One might suppose that bystanders would not appear at all in the
judgment. After all, the process of criminal adjudication is to determine
whether the individual accused committed specific acts with the requisite
criminal intent. Liberalism divides the subjects of adjudication into perpetrators and victims and generally these are mutually exclusive
categories. 221 Evidence introduced must be relevant to the charges against
the accused. Yet how narrowly must the spotlight's focus be trained on
the defendant?
As a formal matter, the court adjudicates those suspected of committing particular international crimes. Family members providing succor to
prison guards, employees of businesses using forced labor, and low-level
civil servants and administrators just "doing their jobs" in public offices
overseen by the Crisis Staff did not directly commit a persecutory act of
a crime against humanity. In order to subject these bystander/
contributors to normative scrutiny, they would need to be considered
aiders or abettors of the crimes of humanity committed by Simi6 and the
others accused.
The legal threshold for aiding and abetting requires suspects to assist, support or encourage a specific offense that constitutes an act of
persecution in a way that has a substantial effect on the commission of
the offense.2 3 Unlawful arrest, detention, or confinement is considered
212.
This discussion has been expounded in a series of published articles between
Robert Meister and Catherine Lu regarding human rights and its use in political discourse. See
Robert Meister, Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 91
(2002); Catherine Lu, Human Wrongs and the Tragedy of Victimhood (Response to Human
Rights and the Politics of Victimhood), 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 109 (2002); Robert Meister,
The Liberalism of Fear and the Counterrevolutionary Project (Reply to Catherine Lu), 16
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 118 (2002); Catherine Lu, Liberals, Revolutionaries, and Responsibility
(FinalRejoinder), 16 ETHICS & INT'L AlT. 124 (2002). In criminal law, the doctrine of duress
is an example where the categories of perpetrator and victim merge. What otherwise is considered criminal behavior is mitigated-and perhaps excused-by virtue of the fact that the
perpetrator performed the act in order to protect another from "significantly greater evil than
inflicted; [where] there [was] no adequate alternative; and the harm inflicted [was not] disproportionate to the harm." GEERT-JAN KNooPs, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 97 (2001); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 17. Under international criminal law principles, the experience of victimhood does not
technically wipe away the stain of criminal acts, but rather goes to mitigate punishment for the
crime, thus preserving the categories of good/evil as the dominant framework for evaluating
human behavior.
213.
Simi6, supra note 8, 161.
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sufficiently grave as to constitute persecution. Implementing orders
restricting the rights of non-Serbs may not necessarily run afoul of the
law,"5 and remaining a silent witness to persecution is virtually sure to
miss the mark. Physical presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient. The complicit bystander/contributor must be a person of sufficient
authority, and prosecutors must show that the individual's presence has
"a significant legitimizing or encouraging effect" on those performing
the offense.216
Bystanders are defined by their inaction; they are "uninvolved" witnesses and thus fall outside international criminal law, which implies a
degree of action and involvement in the criminal acts for liability to attach. The Trial Chamber, acting consistent with principles of legal
liberalism, has drawn the normative parameters of its jurisprudence
tightly to criminalize only conduct that immediately and directly violates
the liberty of victims. The various and attenuated support offered by bystanders falls outside the Tribunal's mandate.
In light of the legal constraints, can the jurisprudence advance the
social goals for international criminal trials by addressing bystanders
directly? Law's dilemma is that courts evaluate individual behavior, and
noninvolvement in the commission of a crime transgresses no norm for
which sanction may be imposed. The power of law to address bystanders
is indirect. To examine what law might do within its present contours,
the Simi6 opinion will first be examined to see how the spotlight of the
courtroom aims through the lens of the charges at the accused and leaves
bystanders in its penumbra. How are bystanders figured in this partial
shadow of the law?
Second, the opinion's treatment of bystanders is evaluated from the
perspective of the opinion as a jurisprudential intervention supporting social reconstruction. Under this social reconstruction "scorecard," the
opinion offers an account of the events in ways that may help and hurt
efforts to have bystanders confront their relationship to the persecution
of non-Serbs in Bosanski Samac. In drawing out these possibilities,
attention is directed at the opinion as a document that memorializes
particular events during the war. The document suggests various interpretations that bystanders-both "silent" as well as "complicit"-and

Id. [[ 59-65.
214.
The court found that discriminatory orders needed to infringe on the basic rights of
215.
group on the same level of gravity as other acts in article 5 of the Statute. Id. 58.
targeted
the
The decision by the Crisis Staff to change the name of the town was not of a sufficiently grave
nature to be considered persecution. Id. 516.
Id. 165. The court reasoned: "It is necessary to consider the relevant facts to as216.
sess the impact of the accused's presence at the scene to determine whether it had a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime." Id.
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other intermediaries such as politicians and the media might infer from
the record. There is no direct data to suggest that bystander willingness
to reconcile is influenced by the language in Tribunal judgments. However, the following analysis suggests that the enforcement of
international criminal law frames discussions of the war and those responsible for it in ways that obscure the relationship of bystanders to the
violence. The ways in which this shadowing occurs should not lead to an
abandonment of accountability. Rather it should focus our attention on
the need to intervene primarily outside the courtroom to avoid perceptions among bystanders that trials relieve them of acknowledging their
moral complicity in mass crimes.
A. How Simi6 's Treatment of Bystanders Underscores
GeneralProblem of Liberal Law Adjudication
1. Construction of Bystanders in the Opinion
Reading the opinion as a text that narrates a story about the past, one
that puts facts in a particular order and context to provide coherence and
meaning to events, the Trial Chamber demarcates time into two periods: before and after the takeover of the town. The former period frames
the Trial Chamber's discussion and analysis of the atrocities and criminal
conduct that occurred after the takeover in the town. 28 The Trial Chamber largely considers bystanders-before and after the takeover-as
passive objects of the events orchestrated by defendants and a small
group of leaders. Only in the separate opinion of Judge Lindholm do
bystanders play a critical, if subsidiary, role. The legal framework drives
the Trial Chambers' reasoning, which also emphasizes individual responsibility for events subject to adjudication and implicitly reinforces a
conception of the conflict as one that was driven by leaders and in which
bystanders played no role.
a. Bystanders Prior to the Takeover
The opinion describes events leading to the forcible takeover in
terms of increasing polarization among ethnic groups within the country
and within Bosanski amac. The Trial Chamber largely recounts the developments in the region in terms of the machinations of political leaders
217.
H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 12-13 (2002).
218.
Section VIII of the Judgment: "Background on Events Leading to the 'Forcible
Takeover on 17 April 1992'" and IX: "Establishment of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanski
amac and of Its Crisis Staff' briefly discuss the background to the alleged crimes of the accused. Simi6, supra note 8,
166-397. The facts and findings related to the charges are taken
up in Sections X-XVII. Id. in 398-1114.
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that appear to reflect as well as create divisions among national groups.
Bystanders are present only indirectly as the voters who voted their national identities, setting into motion political division that erupted into
war. The opinion cites defense witnesses who describe a general climate
29
of fear by late 1991 among "ordinary people" in the area. ' According to
these witnesses, extremist provocateurs from all national groups exacerbated tensions by "provocative displays of nationalist flags, symbols and
songs. '220 An unspecified number of residents from all national groups
moved out of town to escape the climate. 22' There is no evidence of
popular resistance to the logic of division along national group identity. 222 Bystanders are critical to the town's future; their failure to object
to national group polarization paved the way for its bloody triumph. The
opinion does not consider the possible contribution of bystander passivity to the eventual crimes. What we see through the opinion is an
increasingly polarized, segregated community in which political life becomes dominated by politicians and military personnel organized around
national group interests. To what extent the political processes that occurred among the nationalist parties and public institutions they
controlled seeped down to the level of neighbor-to-neighbor, the judgment does not illuminate. We are left watching the political and military
protagonists shape and reshape material conditions in the municipality
after the takeover.
b. Bystanders After the Takeover as a Backdrop to the Main Events
Once the takeover occurs-lasting only a matter of hours-the facts
on the ground, literally, have shifted. With military and political control
over the municipality secured, Bosnian Serb civil and military structures
initiate a widespread campaign of ethnic cleansing-with support by
Serb paramilitaries-that isolates and persecutes non-Serbs. We read the
names of the accused and others who are involved in carrying out the
acts of persecution, but with few exceptions, we are left to imagine how
those not actively participating in persecution reacted or related to the
unfolding events.
Id. 189.
219.
Id. 192.
220.
Id. 193. The court heard somewhat conflicting evidence about the breakdown, by
221.
national group, of those leaving. Prosecution witnesses testified that Croats and Serbs evacuated, while defense witnesses testified that members of all ethnic groups left. Id.
One ambiguous exception is mention of a "rally for peace" that took place just
222.
before the takeover. Id. 181. Witnesses stated that defendant Simo Zari6 assured the crowd
that the 4th Detachment would protect the town from Serb and Croat attack and asked residents to stay and avert civil war. Id. It is not clear who or how many attended the rally and
whether the event was designed to assuage non-Serb residents' fears of external attack or to
assure local Serbs that the JNA would protect them.
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In the Trial Chamber's discussion of the criminal charges of which
Simi6 and his codefendants stand accused, bystanders occupy four
primary roles. First, the Trial Chamber casts bystanders as a collective
that experiences the general deprivations of war and so neutralizes any
special claim to suffering that non-Serbs might assert. Second,
bystanders are a silent chorus who receive knowledge and information
about the suffering of others but who do not intervene to stop it. Third,
bystanders comprise a fearful, compliant mob lacking moral or political
consciousness and will to oppose external forces of evil that are the
cause of the misery and suffering. Finally, we catch a glimpse of
bystanders as moral opponents of the persecution and suffering
unleashed on non-Serbs. However, the overwhelming references to
bystanders in the opinion use this nameless populace as a neutral tool to
illustrate the war crimes individuals committed.
The Trial Chamber uses the baseline deprivations affecting all civilians in the municipality to measure whether civil and military authorities
targeted non-Serbs for particular mistreatment. In the aftermath of the
takeover, the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff promulgated a series of regulations the prosecution asserted were designed to persecute non-Serbs,
including the prohibition on all political activities,223 a ban on gatherings
of three or more Muslims or Croats in a public place,224 a curfew on nonSerb civilians,225 an order that required civilians to obtain a permit to enter and leave the area,226 and a mandate that Muslims and Croats wear
white armbands8.27 Witnesses also testified that phone lines to non-Serbs
22
had been cut.
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution's argument
that the restrictions imposed by the Crisis Staff amounted to discrimination. The judges determined that many of the orders, such as the ban on
political parties, the requirement of travel permits, the imposition of a
curfew, and the regulation of alcohol and fuel applied equally to Serb
and non-Serb civilians.2 29 The judges accepted evidence that general deprivations caused by the fighting-shortages of food, electricity, water,
and medical supplies-afflicted all residents within the area and that the
Crisis Staff did not target for exclusion or withhold basic life necessities
from non-Serbs. 20 Here we see how war destroys the infrastructure that
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. 465.
Id. [468.
Id. ]471.
Id. 1475.
Id. 1 478.
Id. 487.
Id. U 505-12.
Id.IN 512-14.
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supports communal life. Bombs that strike "enemy" power lines or water
supplies leave Serb and non-Serb thirsty and in the dark. Bystanders
serve as a measuring stick for the sinking standard of living, brought
about by the conflict, which affects civilian friend and foe alike.
Bystanders also serve as witnesses to the forced labor of targeted
non-Serbs and elevate the coerced work into a criminal spectacle. The
Crisis Staff established a forced labor system after the takeover and
placed several prominent non-Serbs in work assignments designed publicly to humiliate them."' Civilian authorities ordered a former bank
director and the manager of the local textile factory to perform menial
labor at the sites of the establishments they formerly ran. The Trial
Chamber considered these assignments as rising to the level of cruel and
inhumane treatment because the public spectacle the non-Serb victims
were forced to perform "debas[ed] them and the group to which they
belonged., 232 Without an audience, the Trial Chamber implies that the
labor itself would not rise to the level of criminal persecution.
Thus, bystanders are necessary for the forced labor of these citizens
to offend the law. Yet the bystanders are silent and invisible. The Trial
Chamber does not indicate if any spectator testified about the impact of
witnessing these events. We may assume, as the judges do, they are
there: unnamed civilians who walk by the bank and see the former director with broom in hand cleaning the streets. We are left to imagine textile
workers who walk past the former director while he cleans the dirt underneath their feet. And we may speculate that the bystanders
understood, as the judges did, that these high-status individuals were
reduced to menial laborers as "part of a pattern targeting the233Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat political and economic leadership.,
Similarly, bystanders serve as necessary but inert recipients of news
of deprivations visited upon non-Serbs. Tadi6 and witnesses testified that
the widespread arrest, detention, and mistreatment of prisoners were
common knowledge in the area. 2 - Authorities targeted non-Serb civilian
women and children and rounded up and arrested a group of Croat
women and children from the town market, an event likely to be witnessed and much discussed by local residents. The Trial Chamber used
the oral circulation of news about beatings and torture of non-Serb pris-

231.
Id. [[778-86.
232.
Id. 1837.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
518, 613. Codefendant Tadi6 "testified that the mass arrest of non-Serbs was
common knowledge." Id. T 518. He also explained that he learned of arrests from "well- or illintentioned citizens" as well as members of the Crisis Staff. Id. T 613.
235.
Id. T 556.
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oners throughout the small community to attribute to Simi6 knowledge
of the mistreatment. The judgment notes that:
Bosanksi Samac is a small town and that the cruel and the inhumane treatment of non-Serb prisoners was extensive and took
place over a period of several months. The cries and moans of
prisoners in the detention centres in Bosanksi Samac and their
forced singing of Serb nationalistic songs could be heard outside
these premises .... The Trial Chamber does not accept Blagoje
Simi6's testimony that he did not know about such mistreatment.236
Bystanders function as a saturated sponge of circumstantial evidence
attesting to the ongoing torture of former neighbors in their midst. Civil
and military personnel arrested non-Serbs over such a long period of
time, snatched so many civilians from their homes and off the streets,
and so brutally treated prisoners that news of their suffering overflowed
the walls of the prisons and filled the ears of passersby. Those bystanders, like Simi6, could not ignore that the cries of prisoners meant Serb
authorities were breaking the bodies and spirits of the non-Serbs who
had, only months before, been equal participants in the civil life of
Bosanksi amac.
The Trial Chamber's exception to the role of bystanders as passive
receptacles of knowledge-if not approving voyeurs-about the horrors
unfolding is its mention of a witness who overhead a representative of a
refinery from another town rebuff defendant Simo Zari6's offer to supply
the industrialist with forced laborers. As mentioned above, the businessman rebuked Zari6 and warned him that he "should be 'careful of what
he was doing so that he would not be ashamed of himself later.'" 237 Of
the 657 paragraphs devoted to the alleged offenses and the liability of
defendants, this was the only voice of a bystander verbalizing opposition
to defendants for the persecution of non-Serbs." 8 Yet his words punctuate
the opinion as a reminder that not all who witnessed the events approved
of them.
c. Bystanders After the Takeover as Participants in Atrocities
Only the dissenting opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm puts a decidedly negative cast on the bystanders of Bosanksi Samac. Lindholm
rejects the prosecution's argument that Simi6 shared the criminal intent
236.
Id. 1008.
237.
Id. 828.
238.
Id. [ 398-1055. These paragraphs of the judgment address the substantive offenses
and the role of the accused.
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of a joint criminal enterprise to perpetrate the majority of the substantive
forms of persecution as crimes against humanity on the non-Serb population. Rather, he opines:
The tragedy that followed the takeover was ... not a result of
any previous plan amongst certain individuals. The situation
went out of control due to the activities of a number of criminals
who opened the sluice-gate to evil, which thereafter was willingly accepted and used by malicious and easily-ledpeople.239
Although he does not name the "criminals"-presumably he means
the paramilitaries-he also does not include Simi6 among them. He finds
that Simi6 was aware of but did not intend for military and paramilitary
forces to arbitrarily arrest, detain, beat, and torture non-Serbs. By virtue of
his responsibility as the president of the Crisis Group, Lindholm finds that
Simi6 had a duty to protect civilians under his charge and that his failure
to do so had a substantial effect2 on
the perpetration of the acts; on that ba°
sis, he finds the accused guilty. 4
Lindholm does not further specify who comprised the "malicious
and easily-led people" who took advantage of the opportunity to do evil.
These may include the civilian looters who worked alongside soldiers
and the non-Serb civilians the Crisis Group ordered to fleece the homes
and businesses of non-Serbs. They may also be employers who eagerly
used the forced laborers offered by accused Zari6. And potentially Lindholm's description encompasses bystanders who did not intervene to
prevent or mitigate the arrest, detention, and deportation of their former
neighbors. In fact, Lindholm intimates that those who stood by were
complicit bystanders-those who silently cheered the evil visited upon
the non-Serbs in their midst, celebrating the expulsion of their enemies/neighbors.
2. Simi6 as Bystander Intervention: Acknowledgment of Loss,
Restoration of Control, and Acknowledgment of Role
The way bystanders figure in the judgment should not surprise us, as
they are not the focus of the law. However, the legal framing of bystanders has particular implications for the ability of trial records to shape
public discussion in ways that will help strengthen a culture of respect
for human rights and thus promote social reconstruction. Revisiting the
argument that Weinstein and I advanced, outlined earlier, 4 ' that interventions to promote social reconstruction should acknowledge the loss
239.
240.
241.

Separate Simi Opinion, supra note 198, 1 9 (emphasis added).
Id. I 11.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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experienced by the bystander due to the violence, restore a sense of mastery and control over one's life, and acknowledge the relationship of the
bystander to horrors, how does the Simi6 judgment measure up?
The opinion narrates a history of events leading to the takeover of
Bosanksi amac that emphasizes political developments-primarily voting patterns-at the national and regional levels.2 2 Political life and later
social life becomes segregated and antagonized along national group
boundaries. 243 After the takeover, the brutal treatment of non-Serbs is
carried out by the Serb civil administration backed by paramilitary and
Serb armed forces. It is a bloody campaign to contain and remove nonSerbs from the region that Simi6 and the other members of the Crisis
Staff conduct in the name of the Serbs of Bosanksi Samac. Serb bystanders are relegated to spectators who suffer passively the deprivations
of food, water, shelter, and security caused by the war. The animating
actors of the conflict are nationalist political parties, the politicians who
populate them, and their armed forces, not the collective will of citizens
who voted the politicians into office. The opinion is consistent with the
argument that trials stigmatize the "bad" members of the national group
bystanders from the
that carried out the violence and free the "good"
2 4
same national group to reconcile with victims.
The physical losses of Serb bystanders are acknowledged explicitly
through the Trial Chamber's taking stock of general war-time measures
imposed on civilians and the effects of damaged infrastructure on their
quality of life. The opinion also documents through the destruction of
the integrated Bosanksi Samac-the widespread and systematic persecution of its non-Serb population-the loss of control of the "good" (as
opposed to the complicit) Serb bystanders over their town. The opinion
affirms the perspective that the persecution directed by particular individuals destroyed the community and made the silent bystanders victims
of Simi6's criminal leadership.
The opinion condemns the accused for their roles in persecuting the
non-Serbs of Bosanksi Samac. Their arrest, subsequent conviction, and
imprisonment stigmatized Simi6, Tadi6, and Zari6 and removed the de242.
Nationalist propaganda of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat parties prior to the war
contributed to increasing political radicalization, helped to create a climate of fear, and fractured group formation along national group lines among voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD
WAR

225-36 (1995);

NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA:

A

SHORT HISTORY

213-33 (1994). Fear of

those belonging to "other" national groups contributes to passivity among bystanders who fail
to intervene to halt the polarization within their communities.
Simi6, supra note 8, IN 176-93.
243.
244.
Casesse, supra note 13; STOVER & PERESS, supra note 18, at 138; IGNATIEFF, supra
note 13, at 178; Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the FormerYugoslavia?, supra note
18, at 741-42; BASS, supra note 9,at 297-301.
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fendants from power. Freed from the clutches of criminal leaders, silent
Serb bystanders can recover control over local government and install
leaders who can work to mend frayed communal ties. Consistent with
the assertion that international trials promote reconciliation by differentiating the "bad" Simid from the "good" citizens, the opinion reinforces
the conception that Simi's conviction helps restore a sense of mastery
and control to the lives of "innocent" Serb bystanders.
As for their relationshiop to the violence, the opinion depicts Serb
citizens as silent bystanders to the mass persecution of non-Serbs in
Bosanksi amac and does not provide any explicit normative evaluation
of their behavior. The judges present Serb bystanders as impotent witnesses to the public humiliation of non-Serb leaders, the mass arrest of
non-Serb women and children, and the cries of tortured prisoners. The
liberal legal judgment identifies individual civil leaders as the culpable
protagonists who effected the destruction of communal ties through mass
arrests and brutal treatment of civilians. Bystanders are at an uncomfortable distance from the atrocities: close enough to see and hear, but
unable (and perhaps unwilling) to intervene. Consistent with the application of criminal law, the judgment interprets the atrocities as the product
of individual acts and omissions by the accused and other military actors. Thus the opinion understands bystanders as essentially irrelevantfactually and legally-to its account of the destruction of prewar life in
Bosanksi Samac.
a. Simi6 Promotes Social Reconstruction
Beyond adjudicating the guilt or innocence of the accused, a judgment of an international tribunal is a document that can frame public
discussion about the events that formed the basis for the charges. As a
potential catalyst for debate at the national and community level, it is
important to examine how the opinion's treatment of bystanders configures their role and how it may help or hurt the process of social
reconstruction.
The Trial Chamber constructs a particular vision of the conflict and
downplays other possibilities about the experiences and orientation of
Serb bystanders to the events in Bosanksi Samac. The charges of individual culpability for crimes against humanity and liability for the
suffering of non-Serbs-arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, humiliating
and degrading treatment, and forced transfer-focuses judicial attention
on the decisions and actions of Blagoje Simi& The prosecution of the
highest civilian official in Bosanksi amac locates the genesis of persecution in the choices Simi6 made in organizing and exercising his
authority. And the majority opinion unflinchingly condemns Simi6 for the
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choices he made: he chose to become head of the Crisis Staff;25 he failed
to use opportunities available to him to "distance himself' from the persecutory activities of authorities; 246 he chose to associate himself with
members of the military, paramilitaries, and police known to be brutalizing civilians. The Trial Chamber convicts Simi6 of crimes against
humanity because he breached his duty to "prevent non-Serb citizens
from being persecuted. 248' The opinion identifies the cause of the mass
and systematic persecution in the choices made by individual criminals.
Simi6 and his identified cronies are liable and not the collective Serb
population: bystanders witness the evil "innocently" from the sidelines.
The opinion implicitly relieves bystanders in whose name authorities
perpetrated the violence of guilt associated with those crimes. Those
who argue that international criminal law supports reconciliation by differentiating the culpable leaders from the masses find support in the
opinion.
The legal framing of the trial endorses a conception of the mass violence as orchestrated by individual leaders. The court is asked to
determine the individual culpability of the accused-the centerpiece of
which is their criminal mental state. Individuals must act with the requisite state of mind in transgressing normative bounds in order to satisfy
fundamental notions of fairness. The international law of crimes against
humanity enshrines this same principle. With respect to persecution as a
crime against humanity, the ICTY judges evaluate through direct or inferred evidence whether the accused "consciously intend[ed] to
discriminate., 250 The judges castigate Simi6 for his failure to resign or
245.
Simi6, supra note 8, 1079.
246.
Id.
247.
Id. 1080. The Trial Chamber did not note that Simi6 also betrayed his Hippocratic
Oath as a physician by enabling the paramilitaries and his defense force to brutalize civilians
in and outside detention facilities. His involvement in the repression and control of non-Serb
civilians raises provocative questions about the role of doctors in war. See MICHAEL H.
KATER, DOCTORS UNDER HITLER

(1989) (examining the impact of Nazi doctrines on the

medical community and suggesting that their violation of the Hippocratic oath continues to
impact medicine today); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

(1986) (discussing the social and ideological shifts that en-

abled the Nazification of the medical profession). The debate surrounding the role of
physicians in conflict continues; for recent examples, see Steven Miles, Abu Graib: Its legacy
for Military Medicine, 364 THE LANCET 725 (2004) (describing the complicity of military
medical personnel in the abuse of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay); M.
Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and Interrogatorsat Guantanamo Bay, NEW
ENG. J. MED. (June 22, 2005) (indicating that medical information was used in interrogation
techniques employed at Guantanamo Bay in violation of clinical confidentiality).
248.
Simi6, supra note 8, T 994.
249.
See sources cited supra note 242.
250.
Simi6, supra note 8, J 51. Presumably the actions and behaviors of others may influence individual choice, but the defendant is in the dock and the judges are tasked with
determining the accused's actions and choices.
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mitigate the harm of Crisis Group policies. One assumption of liberalism
played out here is that war criminals ultimately act on their own volition-the quiescence of bystanders and their impact on the decisions of
leaders stands outside the ambit of judicial review. The court reasons that
leaders acted on their own accord and must accept the consequences of
their actions. This focus on responsibility at the highest levels may facilitate social reconstruction in the region by assuaging fears of bystanders
that the ICTY judgments condemn the national group of the accused
along with the defendant.
Yet trial records are capable of divergent interpretations and so may
not help Serb residents of Bosanksi amac to embrace their non-Serb
former neighbors. The opinion acknowledges a particular type of loss
bystanders experience, relies on the assumption that bystanders approve
of the political dimensions of trials, and understands the relationship of
bystanders to the violence as silent witnesses who are passive victims.
This perspective may not correspond with opinions among the bystander
audience or may not sufficiently capture the complexity of bystander
experiences of the war. In fact, the opinion may frustrate use of the record to impel bystanders to acknowledge their role in mass violence.
Therefore it is critical that mechanisms of individual accountability be
one part of a larger range of programs that together encourage all residents-whether victims, perpetrators, or bystanders-to participate in
social reconstruction. To understand how international criminal trials
may hinder bystander acknowledgment, consider the following contrary
set of assumptions regarding bystanders and how these intersect with the
goals of interventions to promote social reconstruction.
b. Simi6 Challenges Social Reconstruction
The legal framework of individual accountability works to limit the
extent to which judges might expound on the experience of bystanders
during mass violence, but the moral truth (or truths, since bystanders do
not necessarily share similar perceptions of the war) of their experiences
to which both silent and complicit bystanders cling will influence their
willingness to forge a shared future. Looking at how the opinion's account of events in the region conceptualizes bystanders' roles in ways
that downplay or distort their experiences alerts us to some shortcomings
of trials as an intervention to promote social reconstruction with bystanders.
The Trial Chamber acknowledges the disruption of daily life of residents in Bosanksi Samac caused by the destruction of basic infrastructure.
Yet the opinion does not examine the social and political losses resulting
from the war, each of which poses different challenges for rebuilding
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communities. The opinion does not acknowledge the silent bystander's
loss of community and trust-between Serb and non-Serb or between
bystander and Serb civilian leader-as a result of being a passive audience to the rising violence. Bystanders witness the persecution unleashed
on their non-Serb brethren, but the opinion does not explore the meaning
of these experiences for the Serb bystander audience. Was there a yearning for an integrated community of Serbs and non-Serbs among the
"well-intentioned" citizens that the Trial Chamber did not voice? Acknowledgment of the hope and desire of silent Serb bystanders,
contemporaneous with the persecution campaign, that the unleashed evil
could be stanched might assist these "good" Serbs in reaching out to victims in the aftermath of violence.
Shifting focus from the text of opinions to the political context in
which judgments operate, trials may fail to restore a sense of mastery or
control among complicit bystanders. Judge Lindholm opines that "malicious" Serbs and their "easily led" followers pressed their advantage
after the takeover to unleash a macabre bacchanal of violence against
non-Serbs.' Presumably, within the majority of Serbs of Bosanksi
Samac who supported the SDS there were those who approved of the
Crisis Staff takeover and understood the mass arrests of non-Serbs as
necessary to protect the town from attack. Supporters of the SDS and the
Bosnian Serb armed forces may experience the Dayton Peace Accords as
a "loss." After all, the agreement left them short of their goal of a separate state and the end of fighting ushered in an era of increased pressure
on their political leaders and war heroes to defend against criminal
charges in The Hague. Trials of Bosnian Serb accused war criminals are
not intended as a salve on the wounded pride of SDS supporters. To the
contrary, complicit bystanders are expected to repudiate their nowdiscredited leaders and join hands with the victims. Theorists and empirical studies have pointed out that this is not a reasonable
expectation.252
The political climate of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina has colored local views of the Tribunal. Studies have found that criticism of the
ICTY by Croat and Serb nationalist parties in particular have distorted
how bystanders from those national groups view the court.253 Contrary to
the liberal legal project of the Tribunal, Bosnian Serbs understood the
court as a political institution that unfairly stigmatized their national
251.
See SeparateSimi6 Opinion, supra note 198, 9.
252.
Meister, Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood, supra note 212, 38-47; Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 193.
253.
Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 195-96;
Judges Study, supra note 5, at 147-49.
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group.5 Political life remains segregated along national group lines, and
the SDS, the dominant Bosnian Serb party, promotes itself as the defender of Bosnian Serb interests and identity against the efforts of the
ICTY to cast Bosnian Serb war heroes as criminals. The studies by the
Human Rights Center suggest that this nationalist rhetoric has considerable traction. The premise of international trials is that the legal process
of removing the criminal leaders helps silent bystanders rebuild their
formerly integrated communities. However, the logic of nationalism continues to hold sway over political life in the country, and Bosnian Serb
bystanders are unable or unwilling to admit that members of "their"
group committed war crimes. 255 The goals of transitional justice are
thwarted because Serb complicit bystanders identify with past leaders2
now war criminals-rather than with their victims. 6 Thus, the efficacy

of trials to promote social reconstruction will be limited by the larger
domestic political context of the countries in which the violations occurred.
Finally, trials are not able to address adequately the relationship of
bystanders to the violence. Prosecutions do not offer complete, differentiated pictures of bystander involvement in mass violence. The court in
Simik depicts bystanders as neutral observers of the persecution. Yet
there is a wide spectrum of involvement in the violence short of criminal
behavior, and it stands to reason that many Serb residents of the area
were anything but "neutral" regarding the treatment of non-Serbs. Some
opposed the persecution and tried to intervene. They alerted officials like
Tadi6 to incidents in the hope of stopping the arrests and beatings. Or
like the industrialist who refused Tadid's offer of forced laborers, they
voiced their disapproval of the Serb administration. However, the ways
254.
255.
256.

Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction,supra note 3, at 193.
Id. at 195.
Meister questions the theoretical assumption of transitional justice that

beneficiaries of past injustice are expected ... to identify with individual victims
... now that they know the 'truth' about the regime they condoned.... The objective of Human Rights Discourse will be achieved when those who happened to
come out ahead in the old order acknowledge as evil the practices that produced
their continuing advantage.
Meister points out that this theory assumes that victims of atrocities will forego distributive
claims and accept acknowledgment of the former evil as sufficient "compensation" to abandon
armed struggle and "get on with their lives." Meister, Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood, supra note 212, at 17. The empirical case of Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests a
different critique of the conventional conception of transitional justice, focusing on its failure
to account for distortions among the beneficiaries-or bystanders from the aggressor groupwhen the new regime is installed as result of only partial victory/defeat. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community brokered a negotiated resolution that left intact the
national Serb party, the SDA, as a potent political force.
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in which bystanders resisted-however passively and ineffectively-are
barely hinted at in the opinion. The jurisprudence of the international
tribunals is valorized as a necessary monument to the "truth" of part of
what transpired in the conflict. Yet the deeds of the "good Serbs" are
omitted from the record-they are not the focus of the proceedings-and
their absence may have troubling consequences for using the opinion to
support the goal of community rebuilding imbedded in the statute of the
court.
And what of the relationship of the "bad Serbs" who stood by and
allowed the floodgates of evil to unleash crimes against humanity on
their neighbors?1 57 Complicit bystanders are not legally culpable, yet victims may consider "justice" to require a direct response from
accountability institutions (or other mechanisms) that sanctions or stigmatizes these individuals for their passivity. The Simi6 opinion takes no
notice of this group. The argument advanced here is not to extend theories of legal liability to include members of this group, but to examine
the consequences of the law's failure to sanction these "culpable" bystanders.
One can imagine a range of bystander actions that contributed to the
widespread and systematic persecution unleashed against the non-Serb
population of Bosanksi Samac but which fall below the radar screen of
the international criminal law of crimes against humanity. For example,
the family members and friends who may have soothed the conscience
of guards who beat and tortured prisoners, reassuring the executioners
that their cause was just and that non-Serb civilian prisoners were a danger to communal safety, enabling the killers to return to their jobs day
after day, are not subject to legal scrutiny. Leaving aside questions of
conservation of judicial resources, why do these individuals escape judicial review? The jurisprudential answer is that these individuals do not
occupy positions of sufficient authority to pierce the legal membrane
between bystanders and aider/abettor. Falling through the legal lacunae,
these marginal participants escape legal attention or condemnation.258
257.
The use of examples of Serb bystanders and perpetrators is intended to be consistent with the example of the Simi6 case and serves as the vehicle for exploring broader
relationships between jurisprudence and social reconstruction. It is not intended to convey that
only Serb nationals committed war crimes or were bystanders.
258.
There is a range of complicity in the administration of mass violence. Those who
offer emotional support may be at one end. A more ambiguous category are members of the
Crisis Staff who administered the persecutory campaign against non-Serbs. Some would have
drawn up and executed plans to plunder Bosniak homes and businesses. Simid and the other
members of the executive committee of the Crisis Staff relied on subordinates who populated
the lower echelons of the administrative apparatus to implement their crimes against humanity.
Depending on the level of authority and degree of action, some of these civil servants could be
held liable for their participation.
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The problem for the project of social reconstruction is that trials are
not able to consider the relationship of bystanders to mass violence in
anything other than a partial, reductive manner. However, just because
bystanders did not do anything criminal in the eyes of the law does not
mean they did not do anything wrong in the eyes of victims. Bystanders
need to be pressed to acknowledge and confront the distance between,
on the one hand, their implied innocence in ICTY opinions and, on the
other hand, their condemnation as betrayers by their non-Serb former
neighbors. Court opinions obscure the relationship of bystanders to the
violence and so inadvertently make it harder rather than easier for communities to engage in this important but treacherous conversation.
B. Proposalsfor ProperTreatment of Bystanders
Within InternationalCriminalJustice
This section reconsiders the goal of international trials to promote
social reconstruction in light of the Simi6 judgment. The treatment of
bystanders in Simi6 is emblematic of the limits of liberal law adjudication of mass violence and raises questions about the role of criminal
trials to promote this normative goal. Simi points to more general problems for international criminal justice to tackle from the perspective of
promoting social reconstruction among bystanders. In light of these concerns, two proposals are offered to reform these international tribunals.
The first focuses on juridical reform consistent with the current case law
and conceptions of legal reasoning. The second looks at institutional reforms that require international criminal tribunals like the ICTY to
expand their vision and ambitions for the outreach activities of these justice institutions.
1. Three Problems International Criminal Justice Needs to Address
The Simi6 opinion suggests three general observations regarding the
way in which the principles of international criminal justice are in tension with, if not working against, the objective of acknowledgment by
bystanders of their relationship to mass violence. These observations are
descriptive in nature and emerge from the foregoing analysis. They alert
us to some limits of accountability mechanisms of which we should be
aware and address, either through the activities of these tribunals or
through other institutions.
First, international criminal law adjudications are not able to parse
out the variety of roles and relationships that bystanders may have to the
atrocities, and therefore judgments condemning perpetrators are unlikely
to change the opinion of the unreconciled or complicit bystandersthose who continue supporting the political project for which the
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perpetrator committed the atrocities. Second, international criminal convictions single out and stigmatize the accused, normalizing the behavior
of bystanders and potentially creating a false moral innocence for the
unindicted and their bystander supporters. Finally, international criminal
law constrains the doctrinal ability of international justice mechanism to
address more directly the role of bystanders in atrocities. The principles
of fundamental fairness and due process which strengthen the credibility
of these institutions also limit their ability to promote role acknowledgment among bystanders.
This section addresses the contribution of judicial opinions-as
documents that record the evidence and reasoning of the judges-to this
process. It is unlikely that any sizeable number of individuals in the region will read the opinions of the Tribunal. Popular reactions will be
filtered through other media. Nevertheless, the trial judgments are the
official records of the ICTY and as such will frame subsequent interpretation and discussion of the cases. Thus, accountability mechanisms
should act within their institutional capabilities to prompt bystanders to
reckon with the past.
a. Liberal Law Cannot Sufficiently Differentiate Bystanders
First, criminal trials are ill-suited to acknowledging the range and
complexity of bystander relationships to the violence. Trials may work
best as an intervention to promote processes of social renewal-among
bystanders and between bystanders and victims-for those in agreement
with the normative assumptions upon which trials as a form of transitional justice are based: the silent bystanders who disagreed with the
leaders perpetrating atrocities in their name but who were unable to liberate themselves from the yoke of the criminal regime. Those bystanders
who are willing to reject their leaders and their political projects can find
acknowledgement of their loss and victimization in criminal trials. Court
opinions confer legitimacy on their experience as suffering at the hands
of criminal authorities. And, as a testament to this perspective, this Article suggests that the publicization of the truth about past crimes in trials
may aid bystanders in forging new links with victims based on a politics
of tolerance and respect and rejecting divisions based on a politics of
nationalism and fear.259

259.
As one Croat woman in Mostar commented on the extent that trials facilitated reconciliation: "We all know what happened, but it is easier when you hear a criminal confessing
his crimes.... [I]t means a lot to you when you hear a confession." Corkalo et al., Neighbors
Again? Intercommunity Relations After Ethnic Cleansing, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY,
supra note 7, at 149.
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At the same time that convictions may aid some in their willingness
to reconcile, other victims may find that justice measures do not meet
their needs. Definitions of and priorities for justice vary among survivors. Some find justice in economic growth and opportunity; for others it
means returning home; still others wanted to forget the past and move
on; some victims want revenge. 26° Trials are unlikely to convince supporters of the accused to reject their former leaders and forge new ties
with former enemies. Those who identify with the goals of their leaders
may ignore the liberal intention of trials to differentiate between bad
leaders and good citizens and understand a judicial inquiry into the actions of a leader of their national group as an indictment of the
collective. And the liberal principles of adjudication that single out an
individual for approbation also make the accused into a symbol that
complicit bystanders defend. The record becomes distorted to preserve
national pride instead of stigmatizing and shaming the defendant in the
211
eyes of the collective. In the example of the Simi6 case, the opinion is
unlikely to assist the "unreconciled" bystanders-those who continue to
see their former leaders as defending their collective interests-to
change their views.

262

Weinstein & Stover, Introduction, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 3, at 4;
et
al., Neighbors Again? Intercommunity Relations After Ethnic Cleansing, in My
Corkalo
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 7, at 150-58 (research in Bosnia and Croatia found that
rebuilding the physical environment, social environment, and the formation of collective
memory in a manner that promotes ethnic perspective on the past were elements of social
reconstruction for divided cities); Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra
note 3, at 195-99 (explaining how multiple factors contribute to a readiness to reconcile with
members of other national groups). See also Connecting Justice to Human Experience, supra
note 4, at 219 (Rwanda survey data finding little relationship between attitudes toward justice
mechanisms and a willingness to reconcile). Research suggests that for some victims of mass
violence, trials of political and military leaders do not necessarily satisfy their demands for
justice. What is important to them is that the individual who they understand as immediately
responsible for their victimization-the guard who beat them, the soldier who shot their loved
ones, the informant who pointed out their hiding place to authorities, the neighbor who failed
to warn them that their arrest was imminent-are condemned for their actions. Stover, Witnesses and the Promiseof Justice in The Hague, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 7,
at 104-120; Wald, supra note 17, at 195 (questioning the effect of prosecuting political leaders
because "for many victims it is just as important to face down the local village executor of
those nefarious schemes and strategies").
Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 194-5.
261.
In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that international courts will convince
262.
these unreconciled bystanders to conform their opinions about convicted war criminals to
align with court judgments. For example, a recent opinion survey in the Serb-dominated region of Bosnia and Herzegovina found that approximately 60% believed that Radovan
Karadzid, the former president of the self-styled Republika Srbska, was a hero and not a war
criminal. Srdan Puhalo, Radovan Karadzie, Novi REPORTER, June 9, 2004 (Andrej Milivojevic, trans.). Almost half the Serbs surveyed in Prijedor and Croats surveyed in Mostarareas in which Serb and Croat armed forces, respectively, committed atrocities-did not accept the fact that their national group committed war crimes. Attitudes Toward Justice and
260.
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Why is this so? One purpose of the court may be to promote reconciliation, but its legal mandate is to decide the criminal guilt or
innocence of individuals charged with specific crimes. 63 Legal subjects
of trials are the accused and therefore the court addresses itself to measuring the behavior of the defendant against the relevant legal norms. This
process works to obscure the relationship of bystanders to the criminal
conduct of the accused. Simi6 and his co-defendants are judged against
the legal standards of crimes against humanity; the court is not examining their behavior against that of the non-accused-whether bystanders,
or other perpetrators.
In other words, the court is not examining the actions of the "good"
or "bad" Serbs of Bosanksi Samac to confer judicial admiration or condemnation on these groups. The "good" Serbs who attempted to
intervene on behalf of their neighbors are not subject to the court's jurisdiction and neither are the "bad" Serbs who supported the Crisis Staff.
Liberal justice stymies the ability of courts to directly take up the question of the relationship of bystanders to the violence and reduces
bystanders to inert props in the drama of the events at bar. But these
props are sentient human beings. Particularly in a climate of nationalism,
bystanders are free to reject the intended moral condemnation of war
criminals and instead direct their ire at the Tribunal itself.
Outside of the Tribunal's control, nationalist Serb and Croat politicians, particularly from the SDS and HDZ parties, have benefited from
the law's lack of direct engagement with bystanders and criticized the
Tribunal as being biased against their national group. That these parties
continue to enjoy a virtual monopoly on political support among Serb
and Croat voters, respectively, poses significant obstacles to building
political support for strengthening human rights and the rule of law. The
threat that continued political extremism poses to regional peace may
overwhelm the potential positive contribution of the ICTY to this process and points to the need for criminal prosecutions to work in tandem
with other measures to strengthen regional security.

Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 194. Support for prosecuting war criminals varied by
ethnicity in a Rwandan survey. A majority of Tutsi, the victims of genocide, strongly agreed
that trials should punish the guilty; a majority of Hutu merely agreed with this statement.
Connecting Justice to Human Experience, supra note 4, at 212.
263.
Strict adherence to the principles of legality may be more important for international tribunals to bolster their credibility than for domestic judicial institutions which are
integrated into national governance structures. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of "Non Liquet" and the Completeness of the Law, in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196, 217 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.,
2000).
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b. Criminal Trials Encourage False Moral Innocence
A second observation is that liberal law adjudication implies a false
moral innocence among bystanders. Bystanders by definition are exempt
from criminal culpability. Criminal trials essentially ignore bystanders as
moral actors and, more importantly, moral judgment of their conduct or
conscience lies outside the legal mandate of international criminal
courts. Trials provide no direct acknowledgment that bystanders-silent
and complicit-also are beneficiaries of the violence carried out in their
name. The judges in Simi6 refer to bystanders as points of reference
against which to measure persecution directed at non-Serbs. But the
Trial Chamber does not comment on the benefits to Serbs of their not
being persecuted (and indeed such a discussion is irrelevant to the adjudication of the accused). Serbs of Bosanksi Samac benefited most
immediately by not being subjected to the arrests, beatings, forced labor,
and deportation. The Crisis Staff acted to protect their interests.
Throughout the war, the Serb armed forces defended the area and left
Serb residents with their property and community intact at the conclusion of hostilities relative to their non-Serb neighbors.
Karl Jaspers observed that war inflicts harm on victims and bystanders alike, but their "suffering differs in kind, and most people have sense
only for their kind. Everyone tends to interpret great losses and trials as a
sacrifice. But the possible interpretations of this sacrifice are so abysmally different that [in the immediate aftermath of war] ...they divide
people. '2 4
Trials inscribe the difference between victims and perpetrators. Yet
the differences in the deprivations of victims and bystanders are not sufficiently excavated by criminal trials even though these distinctions may
be critical post-conflict. The Simi6 Trial Chamber may acknowledge that
food and fuel shortages left Serb residents hungry and stranded, but it
does not consider the quality of such losses in contrast to, say, the loss of
dignity of Ahmet Hadialijagi6 through being forced to sweep the streets
in front of his former bank,2 65 how the hundreds of non-Serb residents
fared after the Crisis Staff forced them to abandon their homes, or how
the families of non-Serb detainees grieved for their husbands, brothers,
sons, and fathers confined and beaten in Crisis Staff-maintained detention facilities. Court opinions are not tasked with sorting out the relative
benefits enjoyed or harms suffered by bystanders as compared to victims. Indeed, the focus on individual guilt may persuade bystander
beneficiaries to understand the convictions of Simi6 and the like as proof
264.
265.

JASPERS, supra note 52, at 21.
Simik, supra note 8, T 790.
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that the leaders are the guilty ones and that they, the unindicted, are innocent of wrongdoing.
Research in Bosnia and Herzegovina found that bystanders who
were members of national groups which committed mass atrocities advocated for accountability for war crimes but largely did not admit that
"their" forces committed crimes. 266 Instead, they typically identified
themselves and their group as victims of the war and diffused responsibility for atrocities like genocide by claiming that all sides committed
such acts.267 Claiming victimhood status for their group and casting a
general accusation that "everyone" committed atrocities is another formulation of the proposition that if everyone is guilty then no one is. By
individualizing guilt, trials offer the opportunity for complicit bystanders
to deny or evade their role in mass violence. 268 It is possible that reactions
to trials reinforce a myth of "collective innocence" and make it more difficult for bystanders to confront the ways in which they enjoyed the war's
privileges.269
Further research needs to be conducted to test this hypothesis, but the
decidedly mixed review of the ICTY by the local population warrants
deeper investigation. For communities struggling to rebuild, differences in
wartime suffering may be overwhelming. The victims' need for acknowledgment of their suffering threatens to turn to a hardened sense of
betrayal when former neighbors are unable to offer victims their condolences and acknowledge the ways in which they benefited from
belonging to the "victimizer" national group. Truth commissions may be
better suited to the task of attributing the role and contribution of bystanders to mass violence. Yet attention must be paid to the ways that
individual accountability may send a mixed message in this regard so
that the potential for trials to obscure the role of bystanders may be
minimized.
c. Bystanders Remain Outside International Criminal Adjudication
Finally, liberal law principles constrain what international tribunals
may offer by way of a more direct jurisprudential engagement of bystanders. Subjecting individual bystanders to criminal adjudication as
aiders and abettors violates fundamental notions of individual conduct
and intent that offend liberal principles. The alternative of creating a
duty of bystanders to intervene to prevent crimes against humanity raises
266.
Judges Study, supra note 5, at 147; Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction, supra note 3, at 194.
267.
Judges Study, supra note 5, at 147.
268.
Violence and Social Repair supra note 5, at 601.
269.
See id. at 600-01; Judges Study, supra note 5, at 148-49.
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similar concerns. Liberalism's primacy of maximizing individual freedom, combined with its specific hostility to imposing a norm that
individuals put the welfare of others above risk of harm to themselves,
poses significant theoretical (not to mention political and practical) obstacles to bringing bystanders to account for their conduct in a criminal
proceeding. Whether bystanders might be subject to civil sanction or
some other form of public castigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, any process in which an individual would be subject to investigation for his or her noncriminal conduct during the violence raises
similar concerns of violating fundamental principles of legality.
Paradoxically, the principles that restrain the scope of criminal law
also bolster tribunals as a response to crimes against humanity and gross
violations of international law. In addition to offending foundational
principles of liberalism, expanding liability principles to extend to bystanders may diminish the potential impact of criminal trials for social
reconstruction. Select prosecutions of intellectual authors and primary
architects underscore the severity of the crimes and conserve judicial and
investigative resources. 7 0 Trials focus on the role that criminal principals
played to unleash a torrent of horrors on a civilian population. The Trial
Chamber is able to link SimiC's exercise of authority as head of the regional civil authority to specific widespread and systematic persecutory
acts against non-Serbs. Pinning responsibility for the catastrophe that
befell the non-Serb residents of Bosanski amac on the highest ranking
civilian forcefully makes the point that someone-an identifiable official
rather than an unspecified or diffuse collective-is liable for the "floodgate of evil" that opened onto the area.
The due process guarantees enshrined in the criminal process promote confidence in the institution and serve as a basis for the Tribunal to
defend and explain its convictions to critics. To the extent those in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceive the ICTY as a legitimate judicial
institution, the Tribunal succeeds in attributing the war and its consequences to individual choice and action." Solidifying acceptance of the
270.
Should international criminal law extend liability for crimes to bystanders, concerns
about selective prosecution and its perception within the conflict area and the relative amount
of resources to devote to pursuing this broad, new category of culprits would complicate the
administration of international accountability mechanisms. Mechanisms other than criminal
adjudication should be considered for confronting bystanders. This Article focuses on the role
that outreach programs of such justice institutions could play in this effort. See infra Part
IV.B.2-3.
271.
The ability of judges to make calibrated determinations of degrees of responsibility
for crimes committed helps to differentiate perpetrators. Thus, trials may build a more textured
understanding of the roles played by various actors, even if the definition of the crimes excludes bystanders from accountability. For example, the Trial Chamber differentiated among
and between Simid and his co-defendants. Tadi6 and Zari6 received lighter sentences than
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ICTY among bystanders counters the perception that the conflict was the
result of a confluence of factors so diffuse that no individual may be
judged guilty. 27 2 In other words, the Tribunal needs to be understood and
respected as a judicial institution capable of meting out justice impartially and in accordance with principles of fundamental fairness.
2. (Re)writing Judicial Opinions
The legal imperatives of adjudicating criminal trials leave little opportunity to expand judicial review of the relationship of bystanders to
the acts and omissions of war criminals in the dock. One aspiration for
promoting juridical engagement with bystanders would be for judges to
adopt in their opinions the logical expression, consistent with current
techniques of judicial reasoning, of an understanding that their adjudication of criminal acts will assume a political meaning within the
communities of the former Yugoslavia. This awareness could direct
judges addressing crimes with a collective dimension to craft opinions
that do not insulate, but leave open, the roles and responsibilities of bystanders. Articulating degrees of responsibility-not liability-for
crimes of mass violence, tribunals could use their judgments to address a
broader range of actors who contributed to the political and social context in which criminals committed atrocities. In this way, judges might
pierce the moral wall that Jaspers sought to erect between criminals and
bystanders and increase the likelihood of public discussion about the
murky, messy, and often contradictory roles that bystanders play in enabling mass violence. Social regeneration is necessary after wholesale
destruction of communities, but there is no moral justification for this
process to occur at the level of individuals, unaided or unremarked by
legal processes. Bystanders are not centerstage in trials of crimes against
humanity, but their presence is more than an abstraction or shadow.
If the principles that bind the scope of liberal justice also bolster its
efficacy, what if anything can tribunals do within the confines of their
mandate to counter the reductivist tendency of law to edit out the role of
bystanders in mass violence? One modest proposal is that the judges
could caution in their opinions that their findings are limited to those
accused and should not be considered to exonerate those who are not
before the court. Liberal law is unable to adjudicate collective responsitheir former boss (eight and six years, respectively, compared with seventeen for Simi6); and
the judges found Tadid and Zari6 played different roles in the persecution against non-Serbs,
as Tadi6 was liable only for his role in prisoner exchanges while the judges convicted Zari6 for
his involvement in the unlawful treatment of detainees and other substantive offenses. Sinii,
supra note 8, In 1118, 1122, 1126, 1093, 1103, 1105.
272.
Violence and Social Repair, supra note 5, at 598-99; Judges Study, supra note 5, at
147-51.
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bility but it can resist the implication that judgments confer collective
213
innocence. For example, in its discussion of liability principles that
govern the Simi6 defendants or other accused, the court could observe in
dicta that its verdict applies only to the specific individuals before the
court and should not be read to imply the exoneration of any others.
Such an observation is no more than an explicit restatement of basic
principles of adjudication and would not run afoul of principles of liberal
law adjudication.
A more ambitious approach, but still within the canons of traditional
legal reasoning, would be to have the judges observe that the Tribunal's
mandate does not reach those beyond the accused who supported the
individuals and institutions that conducted the crimes against humanity.
For example, in the Simi6 verdict the judges could have noted that there
are individuals who populated civil administration positions, or otherwise provided information or support to military and civil authorities,
who may be innocent of criminal conduct but nonetheless are implicated
in the web of violence.
Judges could write these caveats into the judgments of individual defendants. In addition, the Tribunal could include a general statement in
its annual report to frame interpretations of its work for the public in affected areas. Such a statement would indicate that the ICTY Statute
created the institution to determine individual accountability for specified crimes within the temporal and geographic jurisdiction for the
Tribunal. The nature and scope of the judges' inquiry is to determine the
culpability of the individuals accused of the charges issued by the Office
of the Prosecutor. The judges do not select the defendants nor are they at
liberty to draft the charges. Similarly, the cases forwarded by the Office
of the Prosecutor are the result of an evaluation by that office of the most
appropriate cases to pursue, as well as external factors such as the availability of evidence, securing the arrest of the accused, and decisions
regarding allocation of resources. Therefore, the judgments and trial
273.
Group behavior and its influence on individual volition and participation in harmful
acts or crime is a subject of research and debate, as is the failure for individuals to intervene to
rescue others from harm. See LEON SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER: BEHAVIOR, LAW, ETHICS
(1978) (discussing research that proposes that it is the indifference to suffering of strangers at
the immediate, personal level that provides the basic conditions within which wholesale victimization of genocidal dimensions may be committed). Data suggest that under certain
conditions, individuals in groups will act contrary to social and behavioral norms, which is
illustrated starkly by the deception experiments conducted by Professor Stanley Milgram in
which participants continued to administer electronic shocks even when warnings signs of
distress were posted. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL
VIEW (1997). This research prompts the question of whether collective innocence is a valid
construct in the context of mass violence. For a fuller discussion of this literature and its application to bystanders and collective violence, see Violence and Social Repair, supra note 5,
at 606-17.
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record produced by the Tribunal are not a complete record of all the
events and violations that occurred during the conflict.
The ICTY will only prosecute a fraction of all those responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Accountability for
the full spectrum of perpetrators of war crimes will be left to national
mechanisms. However, criminal sanctions-whether international or
domestic-will not address the relationship of bystanders (understood
broadly) to the violations. While the primary work to promote bystander
acknowledgment lies outside the Tribunal, residents of the former Yugoslavia and those working to promote social reconstruction are welladvised not to interpret the silence of the judges regarding how bystanders are implicated in the processes of social breakdown that result in
mass violence as "proof' of their "innocence." The Tribunal should use
its annual report to encourage all those of the region-whether perpetrators, victims, or bystanders-to use the judgments as an opportunity to
examine the past, a vehicle to examine one's actions, and an exhortation
to build a future where human rights are respected and peace is secured.274
These judicial expressions could clarify the boundaries of criminal
adjudication for bystanders, victims, and perpetrators. Bystanders would
be reminded that individual guilt by some, even at the highest levels,
does not hold them free of blame for the crimes that occurred. Similarly,
a statement like this would serve as an acknowledgement of the loss of
victims whose perpetrators are not in the dock. The court would convey
the sentiment that its verdict in any particular case is not intended to
serve as the record for all crimes committed in the course of the conflict.
This statement would acknowledge the inevitable frustrations of victims
whose ache for justice will not be satisfied in The Hague due to selective
prosecution, lack of evidence, or any number of reasons unrelated to the
substantive harm they endured.
A risk of including explicit acknowledgement of the moral relationship of bystanders to crimes against humanity is that nationalist
politicians might use this type of dicta to bolster their arguments that the
ICTY unfairly attacks "good Serbs" who were doing their jobs or acting
patriotically to defend against attack by enemy forces. True enough, but
the court would also be acknowledging gradations of involvement in
criminal regimes. Greater differentiation among Serb bystanders could
help counter collective thinking and thereby promote a collective identity
that crosses national lines.
274.
Recent ICTY reports have indicated that the Tribunal accepts that its work plays a
part in a broader range of activities to promote peace and stability. However, the institution's
efforts in this regard have been too modest. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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The possible corrective actions international courts may initiate
within the strictures of liberal law adjudication are fairly modest. GiYen
the ways in which trials may be distorted by complicit bystanders and
nationalist politicians, one must consider other actions the court may
take to counter the unintended consequences for social reconstruction of
its operation, as well as the justifications for such initiatives. If courts are
courts, that is to say, if they serve as institutions that hold individuals
accountable according to prescribed norms, international criminal courts
are courts as well as sites where the concept of an "ethos of humanity" is
articulated, its values expressed, and the activities needed to reinstantiate
it in post-conflict communities are voiced.
In other words, the work of international justice is broader than developing and applying specific legal norms to pass on the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It also extends to responding to the social and
political dimensions of its work. Mass violence damages social networks
and patterns that form the foundation for communal life. If justice in the
aftermath of such carnage is to promote the rekindling of these networks,
tribunals need to address how their work impacts communities.
The trouble is that trials do not and cannot, in and of themselves,
"close the circuit" linking legal accountability to social reconstruction.
Trials must work in concert with a range of programs to support this
goal. To maximize the ICTY's contribution to the promotion of peace,
we need to understand the Tribunal as a court as well as an institution
advancing social reconstruction. These projects are complementary but
distinct, each with a different institutional expression. The ICTY as adjudicator may be limited in how it can address bystanders, but the
Tribunal as an institution to promote social reconstruction is freer to act
to counter the limitations or negative impact of the court as adjudicator.
The following section offers a proposal for how international accountability mechanisms should engage bystander communities.
3. (Re)forming International Criminal Justice Institutions
International criminal courts of justice should adopt a dual identity
and programmatic expression to realize fully their ambitions to promote
social reconstruction. As a first step, tribunals should temper their own
and the public's expectations about the potential of trials to transform
post-conflict societies. With a better understanding of the tensions, and
acknowledging that there are unforeseen consequences of prosecutions,
tribunals could actively engage in or support interventions to overcome
these limitations. Thus, understanding the mandates of international justice institutions to include addressing the social dimensions of trials on
impacted communities requires these tribunals to view their work
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through bifocals: one lens being the liberal conception of justice and the
other lens focusing on the distortions that result from looking at mass
violence from the perspective of international criminal law.
The ICTY embraces the reconciliation objective of its statute, to
which the court renews its commitment and toward which the judges
celebrate their progress annually in the Tribunal reports.175 The court
variously articulates the connection between criminal trials and reconciliation, but rests on the assumption that victims of the conflict will be
able to put down arms and set aside their desires for revenge if they see
that individuals are held accountable for their crimes. Initially, the Tribunal asserted its primacy as the linchpin to reconciliation. 76 Over time,
however, the ICTY has toned down its rhetoric and framed trials as playing a critical yet limited role in promoting peace in the region. In its
Eighth Annual Report, the Tribunal noted that it could not try all perpetrators, nor was it the court's role to "analyse all the historical, political,
sociological and economic causes of the war, or to perform alone all the
'2 77
work of memory required for the reconstruction of a national identity.
The following year, acting on directives from the Security Counsel, the
Tribunal announced that it would wind down its work by 2008.278 Acknowledging that it would not be able to prosecute all perpetrators, the
court openly encouraged the countries of the former Yugoslavia to contribute to the work of reconciliation by undertaking domestic trials and
outlined a proposal to regional governments to develop their domestic
judicial structures to conduct prosecutions consistent with international
standards.279
Although the ICTY may be tempering the rhetoric of its contribution
to reconciliation as its tenure draws to a close, the Tribunal is far from
embracing the dual identity proposed here. The court has acknowledged
some of its limits as a judicial institution, significantly (1) that the Tribunal cannot memorialize the diverse contributing causes of the conflict
and (2) that it does not have the resources to bring all perpetrators to justice. The first acknowledgment represents a promising opening for the
court as an institution to articulate more explicitly the limits of its ability
to achieve its peace and justice mandate. It also suggests that the ICTY
can use its annual reports to communicate what it sees through the "sec275.
See supra notes 87, 92, 95, and sources cited therein.
"The role of the Tribunal cannot be overemphasized.... [I]t is a tool for promoting
276.
reconciliation and restoring true peace. If responsibility for appalling crimes perpetrated in the
former Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups will
be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal." First Annual Report, supra
note 87,9[ 16.
277.
Eighth Annual Report, supra note 95, 285.
Ninth Annual Report, supra note 95, 326.
278.
279.
Id. H 326-27.
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ond lens" of its work, which concerns the impact of trials on bystanders.
The second observation seems to undercut the impact of the first by
implying that more trials will produce greater progress toward social
reconstruction. Yet as this analysis suggests, prosecutions in fact may
inhibit the willingness of complicit bystanders to invest in a shared future.
a. Annual Reports
One response is for the Tribunal to offer more extensive observations
through its annual reports about how trials help, and make more difficult,
the process of acknowledgment of one's role in the war. Addressing the
structural limits of trials as a response to bystanders would be an important step towards refraining expectations of the contribution of
international justice to peace. Offering that trials are not able to address
the various types or complexity of relationships that bystanders inhabit
vis-A-vis the violence and that trials may imply a false moral innocence
which principles of justice applied through trials are unable to dispel
would seem no different in character than the Tribunal's previously published observation about its limited role in casting a new national
identity.
At a minimum, it seems reasonable for the Tribunal to articulate
more thoroughly that justice is one aspect of a comprehensive response
to mass violence. Official acknowledgment of the ways in which the project of justice may work counter to its goals may be unpalatable to
Tribunal staff and supporters who view such publication as a sign of institutional weakness. Some may view such statements as not part of the
role of courts but belonging to commissions of historical record or other
non-adjudicative bodies. Yet critical self reflection is necessary in order
to move toward appropriate policy interventions.
Unrealizable goals for international criminal tribunals pose the risk
of loss of legitimacy and support when the achievements of trials fall
short of the mark. It is understandable that at the time the UN established
the ICTY, the Tribunal and its supporters would justify its creation by
arguing that criminal accountability was the cornerstone mechanism to
reconcile former enemies. 2 0 However, in the intervening years, international justice institutions have proliferated. While still criticized, trials
conducted under international auspices have secured a sufficient measure
of permanency in the repertoire of transitional justice mechanisms such

At the time the UN Security Council created the ICTY, the Tribunal was the first
280.
court to conduct international criminal prosecutions since the conclusion of the Second World
War. The institution was new and its support was tenuous.
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that their limits may be scrutinized without risk that the international
community will abandon justice as a response to mass atrocity.
Indeed, a critical evaluation is overdue. The ICTY has been in operation over a decade and its achievements have been adequately
chronicled. At the same time, its capacity for public self-reflection appears relatively modest. 2 ' The Tribunal and other international
accountability mechanisms should do more than acknowledge that trials
are limited interventions;2 12 they need to address the data that suggest
tribunals may work against their objectives.
Clarifying that prosecutions may work in tension with or counter to
efforts to promote reestablishment of inter-ethnic ties would enable these
justice institutions to move forward with intentionality to address the
shortcomings of their responses. Thus, the dualism proposed here requires the institutional capacity of international tribunals to work within
and against their structural limits. The ICTY created an institutional expression to address the social impact of its work: the Outreach
Programme. This is an important beginning; it is the first institutional
gesture acknowledging the need to act on the view through the secondsocial impact-lens of international justice. A quick review of its work
and mandate indicate that the program holds promise but has functioned
primarily as a public relations operation and requires a more ambitious
programmatic agenda to address adequately the counter-justice that trials
produce.
b. Outreach Programme
In its recent annual reports, the Tribunal announced expansion of its
Outreach Programme, yet the activities of this initiative in the region
remain directed toward explaining and promoting a liberal legal response
to the war with insufficient attention paid to addressing the shortcomings
inherent in the Tribunal's justice work. 283 The Tribunal states it is expand281.
In its Fourth Annual Report, the Tribunal observed that the ICTY "remains a partial
failure-through no fault of its own" and attributed the "growing dissatisfaction" with the
Tribunal to the failure of states to arrest those indicted. Fourth Annual Report, supra note 95,
175. See also Fifth Annual Report, supra note 95, (calling on states to provide greater assistance to the ICTY so the Tribunal can achieve its mandate); Seventh Annual Report, supra
note 95, T 4. A notable exception to these themes was the Tribunal's reflection that it was
misperceived in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the court created an outreach program to establish an ongoing presence on the ground. Sixth Annual Report, supra
note 92, U 146-50.
282.
Eighth Annual Report, supra note 95, 285 ("[I]t is not for the Tribunal to analyse
all the historical, political, sociological and economic causes of the war, or to perform all the
work of memory required for the reconstruction of a national identity."); see also Ninth Annual Report, supra note 95, T 327.
283.
Lean budgets for the program also limit the scope of its activities.
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2u
ing its capacity to distribute documents in the local languages and has
increased support to local media to promote greater and more accurate
press coverage.2 8 ' To advance the application of the rule of law within the
Balkans to perpetrators of war crimes, the Tribunal follows domestic
legal reforms, plans to train local judges in international criminal law
(and so transfer its expertise to national judges who will conduct domes286
tic war crimes trials), continues to educate targeted professional groups
(including judges as well as political leaders) about the work of the
287
court, and provided important support to Bosnia and Herzegovina in its
288
establishment of a national War Crimes Chamber of the State Court.
The publicized expansion of the program indicates an increase in the
number of outreach activities but suggests that the difference is more of
degree than kind. The passage regarding initiatives to counter "negative
perceptions" in the region describes these interventions simply as "symposiums, roundtables and workshops" engaging "local legal communities
and nongovernmental organizations, victims' associations, truth and rec' 289
onciliation bodies, and educational institutions. This view suggests that
the problem is one of a failure of bystanders to comprehend how liberal
law operates-and certainly there is a lack of information about the ICTY,
even among legal professionals. We are not given a further description of
the content of these programs other than that the goal of many of these
events is to "mak[e] the work of the Tribunal relevant to the national justice system s ... ,290
In 2004, the ICTY reported that its Outreach Programme held a conference in the northern Bosnian town of Brcko that brought together
ICTY staff, including prosecutors and investigators, with representatives
of victims' associations and local leaders to explain "its methods of operation" and to encourage local authorities to pick up the mantel of
criminal justice after the Tribunal winds up its investigatory work at the
end of 2004.29' Thus, the ICTY implied that the content of the exchange
addressed international legal norms and their application in ways that
emphasized the continuity of international criminal law with domestic
prosecutions.' However, the research data suggest that Serb and Croat
Tenth Annual Report, supra note 95, 1281.
284.
Id. 1284.
285.
Id. 1285.
286.
Id. 1286.
287.
Eleventh Annual Report, supra note 95, 319.
288.
Tenth Annual Report, supra note 95, 283; see also Eleventh Annual Report, supra
289.
note 95, V9 320, 323.
Tenth Annual Report, supra note 95,91 283.
290.
Eleventh Annual Report, supra note 95, [320.
291.
Educating national audiences about the ICTY is a necessary step, but development
292.
of the rule of law and national judicial institutions is also needed in order to ensure the suc-
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bystanders do not wish to acknowledge that their side committed crimes.
The Outreach Programme activities do not indicate the Tribunal is probing alternative strategies to address this larger problem.
What appears missing is an understanding on the part of the Tribunal
that the lack of support for the institution may have as much to do with
limits of prosecutions as with any lack of understanding among bystanders about how the ICTY applies relevant law and procedure. Institutions
of international accountability and domestic civil society should acknowledge and clarify the benefits and risks of trials as a tool to enable
divided communities to work together. Only by understanding how
prosecutions may promote a myth of collective innocence can justice
mechanisms attempt to identify and disrupt such beliefs. It is critical that
institutions of international justice engage local partners in frank discussion of how to develop local interventions to counter the ways in which
trials obscure the role of bystanders and the need for them to address
their relationship to the violence. The Outreach Programme should continue to educate local communities about the methods of international
justice. However, unless the ICTY addresses the resistance of bystanders
to trials of "their" leaders, the Outreach Programme's achievements will
necessarily fall short of the mark. Stimulating bystander acknowledgment is part of attending to the damage caused by mass violence so that
communities may unite behind a shared conception of community in
which neighbor need not fear neighbor.
c. Looking Forward
The ICTY and its Outreach Programme offer important sites for investigation about the potential and limits of international justice institutions to
promote social reconstruction. Although the Tribunal is winding down its
work, a review of its record allows us to draw lessons to improve international criminal law's response to mass atrocities that may inform the work
of the ICC and similar tribunals. The Outreach Programme grew out of a
crisis in confidence over the work of the Tribunal within the Balkans.
Query whether this crisis could have been averted or its impact diminished
had the ICTY initiated this program at the same time it began its investigative work. International justice mechanisms should accept from the outset
that their work operates simultaneously at the level of an adjudicative
body and as a mechanism to promote reflection and new thinking among
bystanders, survivors, and perpetrators about the meaning of the violence
for themselves and their communities. At the same time that tribunals
cessful transfer of justice work from The Hague to the courts in the Balkans. For a more detailed discussion of the need and challenges for greater continuity between the ICTY and
national courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina see A World Unto Itself?, supra note 5, at 29-48.
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work to promote confidence in their capacity to apply the rule of law to
the accused, they must act through an outreach program or other instituthat come with
tional expression to counter the inevitable distortions
293
past.
the
with
reckoning
of
form
a
liberal justice as
The outreach arm of any mechanism of international accountability
must work to explain the legal operation of the court to domestic audiences. But it must also engage in public education of and dialogue with
bystanders to correct any misperceptions that tribunal opinions exonerate
the unindicted or that only those who committed criminal acts contributed to the cataclysm. Tribunal staff and targeted sectors of Balkan civil
society would improve the potential of trials to promote peace if they
considered how to design parallel interventions among bystanders who
currently are hostile to the Tribunal that could stimulate discussion about
their experiences and roles in the war. The outreach work should seek to
collaborate with various sectors of civil society-not only with groups
that are organized according to the categories which framed the conflict
(e.g., ethnic, national, or political groups), but also groups organized
around identities that transcend these categories (e.g,. professional associations and economic sectors). Individual bystanders have multiple
identities-national group, gender, and professional-and outreach activities should be organized around various social formations. The goal is
to stimulate discussion of the past in multiple fora-in boardrooms, shop
floors, parks, schools, dinner tables, and bedrooms. And a tribunal
should incorporate research and evaluative functions into its work so that
it may identify bystander perceptions of its efforts, address areas of concern, and assess the efficacy of its interventions.
The Outreach section of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides
an example of a broader approach to public engagement by an international tribunal. Initially part of the Office of the Prosecutor, the program
became an independent agency and defined its role as serving to link the
9
population of Sierra Leone to the Special Court. In serving this function, the Outreach section has extended its activities beyond legal
professionals and conducted training for national court personnel, members of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, and police about how the
29 5
operation of the court could improve domestic justice administration. It
has also conducted programs in schools and colleges. In addition, the
section has initiated dialogue about the meaning and relevance of the
Special Court with a broad spectrum of society.
A positive sign in this regard is the extensive engagement with local actors from
293.
relevant countries that the ICC Prosecutor has undertaken.
WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, INTERIM
294.
REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

295.

Id.

33 (2005).
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Through a series of Victim Commemoration Conferences, the Outreach section brought together members of government and civil society
from the local, national, and international level to discuss and address
concerns about the court.2 96 From these conferences emerged particular

initiatives to address the issues identified. Thus, the Outreach section
demonstrated the flexibility to design activities that facilitated involvement from civil society with the Special Court and promoted its
relevance to local struggles to rebuild communities.
As the Sierra Leone example suggests, comprehensive outreach
about the contribution of justice to peace requires multiple activities.
Some of these initiatives may be undertaken by justice institutions while
others may be implemented by other multilateral institutions or nongovernmental organizations. For example, films, commemorations, and oral
history projects could help generate discussion about what transpired in
particular communities and the respective contributions of bystanders
and perpetrators to social breakdown and war. These interventions
should be studied and supported by accountability mechanisms so that
the work of justice is not confined to chambers. In other words, the institution must pay adequate attention to both frames-the legal as well as
the social-to keep its work in proper perspective.
V. CONCLUSION

We have imbued the concept of international criminal justice for
mass atrocities with exceedingly high expectations. Criminal trials are to
go beyond exacting punishment from the wrongdoer; they are to help
communities wracked by bloody conflict forgo violence and embrace a
new, collective future. Drawing on empirical data and a model for social
reconstruction that emerged from a recent study from U.C. Berkeley's
Human Rights Center, this Article examines how the ICTY operates to
further this social goal of international justice. In particular, the Article
considers how the application of international criminal law contributes to
and detracts from the potential willingness of bystanders to the violence
to reconcile with victims and perpetrators.
Early supporters of international justice for war crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia argued that justice would promote peace. Criminal
accountability of high-ranking officials is instrumental as a way to re296.
Participants engaged in discussions on a range of topics: "perceptions of justice as
presented by the Special Court; the perceptions of justice and accountability in Sierra Leone;
the perceived legacy of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and
how communities and civil society actors ... can complement the work" of those transitional
justice institutions. Id.
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move criminal leadership from power and as a powerful symbol to repudiate the wrongdoers and their political platforms. With criminal leaders
removed from power, the prediction was that victims and "innocent bystanders" in whose name the crimes were committed would be able to
reconcile.
Over the last decade, we have seen an increase in the number and
configuration of accountability mechanisms that enforce international
criminal law. The experience and track record of these institutions have
led to a more tempered understanding of the contribution of trials to social reconstruction. New thinking and research is emerging within these
tribunals, as well as academic circles, that understands justice as only
one (albeit critical) component needed to secure democracy, rule of law,
and respect for human rights in countries emerging from mass violence.
While it is important to reconceptualize trials as part of a larger panoply
of interventions, attention must be paid to the ways that trials may make
it more difficult for some to reconcile.
Harvey Weinstein and I have argued based on prior research that interventions to promote social reconstruction should stimulate individual
acknowledgement of one's relationship to the breakdown of society. Trials produce an ambiguous record from the perspective of how judgments
may frame understanding and discussion among bystanders about their
role in conflict. The research data and the case study of Prosecutorv.
Simi6 et al. raise doubts about the prediction that individual accountability debunks the myth of collective guilt and allows the "innocent"
bystanders and victims to reconcile.
Some who watched their communities descend into violence silently
approved of the violence, while others may have condemned what transpired but remained passive and did not speak out. The submissiveness
of bystanders enables mass violence, but trials are not well-suited to confront bystanders with the consequences of their behavior. For those who
turned away, individual trials may confirm their sense of powerlessness-a criminal leader and not they are responsible-but the record
does not challenge them to consider the harm of their inaction. Trials
pose additional challenges for bystanders who supported the perpetrators. The research in divided communities in the former Yugoslavia
indicates that residents view those standing trial in The Hague as representing "their" national group. Thus a conviction of an individual is
interpreted as an affront to group identity, engendering criticism of the
ICTY rather than stigmatizing the war criminal. These unintended consequences of enforcing international criminal law deserve close and
careful consideration.
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This Article relies on empirical data regarding perceptions of the
ICTY and ICTR among residents of those countries and a case study of a
single conviction of one of the highest-ranking civilians in Bosnia and
Herzegovina for crimes against humanity. This methodology is limited
and provides no definitive conclusions about the effects of trials on bystanders. Rather, the data and the legal framework of criminal trials alert
us to concerns about the way in which criminal proceedings may frustrate as well as facilitate the goals of social reconstruction. What is clear
is that the doctrinal requirements and principles underpinning criminal
trials constrain their ability to excavate adequately the contribution of
bystanders to mass violence. In the absence of more direct engagement
with complicit bystanders, the danger is that trials do not counter the
ability of those who supported the perpetrators to defend their former
leaders rather than to reflect on their own contribution to the destruction
of their communities. In addition, the lack of acknowledgment of the
anguish of those opposed to the violence but were too fearful to speak
leaves those silent bystanders without a judicial record of their perspective.
More research should be conducted regarding the impact of accountability mechanisms on bystanders. The focus of this Article is on the
ICTY, but the analysis concludes that the concerns highlighted here are
the result, in large part, of the limits of the law to address bystanders.
These shortcomings need to be addressed not only by the Tribunal, but
other international mechanisms of accountability. This Article argues
that in order to respond to the ways in which trials work counter to the
project of social reconstruction, international criminal justice mechanisms need to adopt a dual perspective on their work. These institutions
need to operate as adjudicative bodies adhering scrupulously to the highest standards of professionalism in performing their investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions. Particularly when adjudicating
crimes against humanity, which implicate collective action, judges explicitly should limit their findings of guilt and innocence to those before
the bench and caution that their determination should not be interpreted
to exonerate (or condemn) any other individuals. Opinions should leave
open the possibility that other members of a group are responsible for
mass violence. Thus, trial records should stimulate discussion among
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders beyond the courtroom about the
events that formed the basis of the proceedings.
At the same time, such tribunals need to acknowledge and attend to
the social impact of their work. To date, the ICTY has made spectacular
success as a court but minimal progress toward making its work relevant
to social reconstruction. The lack of progress, this Article argues, is due
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in part to a failure of the institution to accept the limits of the paradigm
of justice in producing a willingness in bystanders aligned with accused
war criminals to embrace a collective future with their former enemies.
A robust outreach program is essential for international justice institutions to address the shortcomings of trials. A few suggestions for deeper
and more varied engagement by outreach programs across a broad spectrum of social segments have been offered. Greater creative thinking is
needed to design activities that will link the justice work of tribunals to
processes of social regeneration. Some activities may be conducted by
an outreach program, but others, for example memorials (or countermemorials), 97 may be more appropriately carried out by other
governmental or nongovernmental entities. What is important is that the
social impact of justice is addressed through the particular accountability
mechanism as well as through other relevant institutions engaged in social reconstruction.
To admit the limits to justice is not to discard it as a component of a
response to mass violence. We know very little about the processes that
facilitate the willingness of communities cleaved apart by violence to
reunite and set upon a shared path toward the future. Criminal trials help
establish social stability by removing wrongdoers from positions of authority and neutralizing their capacity to incite violence. Whether justice
for a few-as is likely inevitable in the aftermath of mass violence-will
help the many residents who remain outside the courtroom engage each
other to rebuild relationships of trust remains an open question. What is
needed is a better understanding of the ways in which international accountability influences perceptions of bystanders-particularly complicit
ones-about their criminal leaders. Legal accountability sidesteps bystanders, leaving their complicity unremonstrated and thereby allowing
them to interpret judgments in ways that evade or exonerate their contribution. Thus, international criminal trials will forever underachieve their
potential to transform communities unless the institutions of justice directly address the ways in which they fail to account for the complexity
of bystanders' relationship to the past. International tribunals aspire to
help remake communities struggling in the aftermath of violence. To do
so they must see clearly and act decisively to capitalize on their success
and counter their vulnerabilities.
James Young has termed a class of memorials in post-war Germany "counter297.
monuments" because they "seek to challenge the very premise of the monument." He
describes how the artists who create these works intend to combat the tendency of memorials
to enable us to forget the past. "They believe, in effect, that the initial impulse to memorialize
events like the Holocaust may actually spring from an opposite and equal desire to forget
them." JAMES E. YOUNG, AT MEMORY'S EDGE: AFTER-IMAGES OF THE HOLOCAUST IN CONTEMPORARY ART AND ARCHITECTURE 96 (2000).

